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The Diplomacy Discount in Global Syndicated Loans 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate whether state-to-state political ties with a global superpower affects the pricing of 
international syndicated bank loans. We find statistically and economically significant effects of 
stronger state political ties with the United States, arguably the most dominant global superpower 
of our times, on the pricing of global syndicated loans. A one standard deviation improvement in 
state political ties between the U.S. and the government of a borrower's home country is associated 
with 14 basis points lower loan spread. This is equivalent to a cumulative savings in loan interest 
payments of about 10 million USD for the average loan in our sample. The effect of political ties 
on loan pricing is also stronger when lead arrangers are U.S. banks, during periods in which the 
U.S. is engaged in armed conflicts such as in the Afghan, Iraq and Syrian wars, when the U.S. 
president belongs to the Republican Party, and for borrowers with better balance sheets and prior 
lending relationships. Notably, we find that not all firms exploit this mechanism, as cross-listed 
firms and firms in countries with strong institutional quality and ability to attract institutional 
investors are much less reliant on political ties for lowering their borrowing costs. 
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1. Introduction 
Cross-border bank-based financing remains an important segment of external financing around the 
world at one time peaking at a value of outstanding claims amounting to over USD 22 trillion in 
2008 which was preceded by decades of growth since the early 1990s. The global financial crisis 
of 2008-09 brought to a halt the meteoric rise in cross-border bank lending and after an 
approximately three-fold expansion over the period 2000-2008, the stock of cross-border bank 
claims has since fallen to about 70% of its peak value by the end of 2019.1 Many other factors 
have since contributed to its relative decline following the crisis. Among these, geopolitical 
tensions have recently surfaced as a key factor. Much of these tensions are linked to the U.S. and 
U.S. foreign policy which has decidedly become more mercantilist of late. In this paper, we study 
how these geopolitical tensions specifically relating to political ties with the U.S. has affected the 
borrowing conditions of private firms who seek bank-based cross-border financing through the 
global syndicated loans market. 
 
  Source: BIS Interna tional Banking Statistics 
                                                 
1
 See BIS statistics at: https://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm  
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Our focus on state-to-state political ties is motivated by the growing literature emphasizing 
the importance of socio-political and institutional factors in the pricing of international debt (see, 
e.g., Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010; Giannetti and 
Yafeh, 2012; Delis Hasan and Ongena, 2020). State-to-state political ties could facilitate cross-
border lending by ensuring smooth and cooperative interaction of regulatory agencies across 
borders and thus enhance cross-border investor protection.2 Specific to the U.S., closer political 
ties with a global military and economic superpower could also provide an implicit hedge against 
sovereign risk. This can take the form of direct economic and military support or indirect support 
through multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank towards home country 
governments of borrowers.3 Consequently, we expect that closer state-to-state political ties with 
the U.S. could help mitigate sovereign risk and improve investor (bank) protection leading to lower 
borrowing costs.  
To test this hypothesis, we consider more than ten thousand loan facilities in the global 
syndicated loan market over the period 1992-2017 along with detailed lender, borrower, and 
country information. Our main outcome variable is the all-in spread drawn (AISD), which includes 
the loan spread over LIBOR plus any facility fee. Our main explanatory variable measure of the 
strength of state-to-state political ties between a borrower's home country and the U.S. Following 
earlier contributions to the literature, we use voting similarity indices on voting patterns at the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between sovereign states and the United States.4 
                                                 
2
 For instance, Lambert (2019) document evidence that lobbying by U.S. banks influence regulatory enforcement 
actions. Braun and Raddatz (2010) document international evidence that politically-connected banks enjoy more 
favorable regulation. In terms of U.S. domestic bailout policies, Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010) find evidence that U.S. 
congressmen who received support from financial sector donors were more likely to vote in favor of the U.S. 2008 
bailout legislation. 
3
 See evidence on the effect of global political ties on IMF and World Bank lending in Thacker (1999), Barr and Lee 
(2005), and Malik and Stone (2018) among others. 
4
 See, e.g., Garmaise and Natividad (2013), Ambrocio and Hasan (2019) and Ambrocio, Gu, and Hasan (2019). 
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We find a statistically sizeable effect of state-to-state political ties on the cost of syndicated 
loan borrowing. A one standard deviation improvement in political ties with the U.S. is associated 
with 14 basis points lower borrowing costs. Economically, this is equal to a 9.5 % lower AISD 
compared to the average in our sample, highlighting a substantial benefit to borrowing firms in 
countries with closer political ties with the U.S. The economic significance of this can also be seen 
by calculating the savings in interest payments for these firms. For the average loan size and 
maturity (equal to USD 1.68 billion and 4.4 years respectively), an AISD that is 14 basis points 
lower corresponds to approximately USD 2.3 million in lower interest expenses every year over 
the loan’s duration. 
Several sensitivity tests show that these baseline findings are robust, and of these, the 
following four are noteworthy. First, we use different sets of fixed effects (see, e.g., Jiménez, 
Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina, 2014) to control for alternative bank- and firm-side explanations of 
our findings and the macroeconomic environment in the lender’s and borrower’s countries. 
Second, we use alternative model specifications with different loan control variables to show that 
the results are not affected by the “bad controls” problem. 
Third, we strengthen the identification of the effects of political ties by looking at 
differential effects during international conflicts. We expect the effect of state political ties to be 
stronger during the buildup and main stages of international conflicts (wars) by the U.S., since 
allies are more likely to be called upon and expected to provide continuous support to the U.S. 
government’s proposals in the UN General Assemblies. We indeed find stronger effects in periods 
when the U.S. is engaged in extraterritorial conflicts such as the Afghan, Iraq, and Syrian wars; 
however this effect is independent of the generic discount in loan spreads due to similar voting 
patterns during the non-war periods. Fourth, we show that our results are not driven by potential 
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sample-selection bias. We estimate a Heckman-type model (Heckman, 1979), which explicitly 
accounts for the probability that a firm takes out a loan with a given bank and find that our results 
remain.5 
We delve deeper into the potential drivers of our results and examine the role of political 
conditions in the U.S. We find that the loan spread discount is greater when the Office of the 
President of the United States is held by a Republican. We consequently examine potential 
differences due to the status of the lending bank and find that the effect is stronger if the lead bank 
is government-controlled. Furthermore, the effect of political ties on borrowing costs is more 
potent for larger firms and those with strong balance sheets (e.g., return on assets, retained 
earnings, asset growth, and lower debt-to-equity).  
Moreover, the easing effect of political ties on loan spreads is independent of that attributed 
to previous lending ties between the bank-firm pair. Although close political ties measure lower 
spreads more for relationship borrowers relative to first-time ones, the generic effect of our voting 
similarity measure persists over and above that of relationship lending. Finally, we do not see 
significant interactions with other bilateral ties with the U.S. such as common borders and 
participation in mutual defense pacts or non-aggression treaties. These results indicate that the 
value of state-to-state political ties with the U.S. operates mainly when the member-banks of the 
loan syndication have tight links to their governments and for borrowers of good credit standing. 
Our results about the easing effect of political ties on firm cost of credit, gives rise to the 
question of whether all firms benefit from this mechanism. Arguably firms with financing 
flexibility and access to foreign capital markets can achieve lower cost of credit ceteris paribus. 
Similarly firms operating in countries with strong institutional environment and ability to attract 
                                                 
5
 See also similar exercises in Dass and Massa (2011) and Giannetti and Yafeh (2012). 
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institutional investors face lower financing constraints. We find this to be the case, as cross-listed 
firms and firms in countries with strong institutional quality are less reliant – if at all – on their 
countries’ political ties as a means for lowering their borrowing costs. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 relates our study to the existing 
literature and further highlights the novelty of our work relative to previous studies. Section 3 
discusses the data set and the empirical specification. Section 4 presents and discusses the main 
empirical results, showing the impact of political ties on the cost of credit. Section 5 examines the 
heterogeneities of our findings due to certain bank and firm characteristics and country 
relationships. Section 6 concludes the paper. An Internet Appendix provides several additional 
summary statistics and robustness checks. 
 
2. Related literature 
This paper builds on the growing literature on the determinants of cross-border bank financing. 
Delis, Hasan, and Ongena (2020) show that democratization is associated with cheaper financing 
costs in the global syndicated loan market while Qi, Roth, and Wald (2010), Qian and Strahan 
(2007), and Bae and Goyal (2009) provide evidence that domestic legal and institutional factors 
related to creditor protection matter. Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) document evidence on the 
importance of cultural proximity between parties in international syndicated loans. Haselmann, 
Pistor, and Vig (2010) find that foreign banks react substantially more than domestic banks to 
improvements in domestic legal institutional quality and creditor legal protection. Houston, Lin, 
and Ma (2012) document evidence in support of regulatory arbitrage in international banking. 
Boehmer and Megginson (1990) study the determinants to secondary market pricing of developing 
country syndicated loans and identify factors related to sovereign solvency as particularly 
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important. Our results adds state-to-state political ties to the list of qualitative country-level factors 
as important determinants of cross-border bank financing. 
We are also related to the literature on the economic implications of forging global political 
ties. The use of voting patterns at the United Nations General Assembly as a measure of state-to-
state political ties follows an established literature such as by Thacker (1999) and Barro and Lee 
(2005) who document the effects of political ties with the U.S. on IMF lending, and Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) on U.S. political ties and U.S. foreign aid flows. Garmaise and Natividad (2013) 
document how global political ties facilitate microfinance funding. Ambrocio and Hasan (2019) 
show that closer political ties with the U.S. lower sovereign borrowing costs while Ambrocio, Gu, 
and Hasan (2019) show that state to state political ties lower the cost of private bond issuances by 
foreign firms in the United States. Our results show that the effects of global political ties with the 
U.S. extend to the cost of global bank-based borrowing in the syndicated loan market. 
Finally, our work complements a related strand of the literature focusing on firm-to-state 
political ties as an important factor in external financing and firm valuation.6 Claessens, Feijen, 
and Laeven (2008) show that political connections, proxied through campaign contributions, lead 
to preferential access to bank financing. Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma, (2014) show that politically 
connected board members lower firm bank borrowing costs. Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, and 
Kwak (2016) show that political connections are especially valuable in crises periods. Our work 
extends this literature by showing that state-to-state political ties also benefit private firms through 
lower borrowing costs in the global syndicated loan market. 
 
3. Data and empirical methodology 
                                                 
6
 See, e.g., Fisman (2001), Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009), Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009), and Banerji, Duygun, 
and Shaban (2016). 
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We obtain data from three sources. Syndicated loan facilities (the unit of our analysis) are collected 
from DealScan, which includes the most comprehensive and historical loan-deal information 
available on the global syndicated loan market. Our examination period extends from 1992 to 
2017. We drop all loans for which there is no conventional pricing (i.e., there is no spread) and 
this deletes all types of Islamic finance and very specialized credit lines. We match the loan data 
with country-level variables measuring international political ties. We further match the loan 
facilities with the bank- and firm-specific characteristics from Compustat, as well as with 
additional macroeconomic and institutional (country-year) variables from several freely available 
sources. The number of loan facilities for our baseline specifications ranges from 10,427 to 10,479, 
depending on the controls and the set of fixed effects used. These loans were granted by 156 lead 
lenders headquartered in 12 countries and to 1,115 borrowers from 25 countries; Table 1 provides 
key descriptive statistics.7 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Empirical identification. To examine whether firm from countries with closer political ties 
to the U.S. face lower borrowing costs we use a regression approach very similar to Giannetti and 
Laeven (2012),  Giannetti and Yafeh (2012), and Delis, Hasan, and Ongena (2020):  
 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝑢𝑙𝑡                                                       (1) 
 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑡 measures the cost of loan facility 𝑙 originated at time 𝑡. The most 
widely used measure is the all-in spread drawn (AISD), denoting the spread over LIBOR, although 
                                                 
7
 Consistent with relevant studies on the syndicated loan market we only include information on lead lenders (see, 
e.g., Santos and Winton, 2019; Delis, Hasan, and Ongena, 2020). 
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a strand of the literature (e.g., Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz, 2016) also highlights the 
importance of fees and the all-in spread undrawn (AISU). The vector 𝑎0 denotes different types of 
fixed effects, described later. Controls is a vector of control variables of dimension 𝑘, and 𝑢 is a 
stochastic disturbance. 
Vote is the Signorino and Ritter (1999) measure of voting similarity in the voting patterns 
of two countries (one of which is the U.S.) from the U.N. General Assembly (see also Garmaise 
and Natividad, 2013). This measure is an index for voting affinity originally ranging from -1 
(completely opposite interests) to +1 (completely similar interests), based on two-category vote 
data (1 = “yes” or approval of an issue; 2 = “no” or disapproval of an issue). The measure is 
constructed for each country 𝑘 in year 𝑡 by averaging the Signorino-Ritter score (S2) of voting 
similarity with the U.S. for each resolution (𝑟) in year 𝑡: 
 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑘𝑡 = 1𝑅 ∑ 𝑆2𝑟,𝑘,𝑡𝑅𝑟=1                                                                                                                               (2) 
 
To facilitate our analysis, the index is normalized and assumes values between 0 and +1, 
although for sensitivity purposes we also employ the non-normalized index, as well as the 
Signorino and Ritter 3-option index (-1, 0, +1), which is the initial index adjusted for missing and 
abstain votes. We further employ a variation of our baseline measure, constructed by replacing the 
Signorino and Ritter (1999) index with the reversed Thacker (1999) voting similarity index in 
equation (2). The resulting 2-option measure (Vote with us), assumes values of 0 and +1, reflecting 
voting completely opposite to U.S. and completely similar to U.S. respectively. 
We identify the lender’s and the borrower’s country as the one in which the lender and the 
borrower respectively is located. In the event where a loan is provided by the parent bank’s foreign 
11 
 
affiliate or subsidiary, the lender’s country is set as the country of the affiliate/subsidiary. 
Similarly, for firms receiving loans through their foreign subsidiaries we set the borrower’s 
country as the country of the affiliate/subsidiary.8 
The main coefficient of interest is 𝑎1, which shows the effect of Vote on the firm cost of 
credit. Differently phrased, we obtain identification from the fact that firms in countries with 
stronger political ties to the U.S. enjoy lower borrowing costs relative to firms in countries with 
weaker ties. We expect that 𝑎1 is negative if country-level political ties are material for the 
determination of loan spreads and thus decrease the cost of credit for firms in countries with closer 
ties. 
 Controls and fixed effects. We include several control variables and fixed effects. 
Following the relevant literature (e.g., Ivashina, 2009; Adelino and Ferreira, 2016; Almeida, 
Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo, 2017; Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang, 2017; Kim, 2019; Delis, Hasan, 
and Ongena, 2020), we control for loan characteristics such as the log of the loan amount, loan 
maturity (in months), the number of lenders in the syndicate, dummies for performance-pricing 
provisions and/or collateral, and the total number of covenants.9 We also control for the total assets 
of the bank (Bank size), the bank return on assets (Bank ROA), and the bank’s non-performing 
loans (Bank NPLs). Similarly, our firm controls include the firm size (Firm size), the firm return 
on assets (Firm ROA), the firm common equity capital (Firm equity) and the firm debt ratio (Firm 
debt). We include borrower’s country-level variables, such as the GDP growth rate (GDP growth), 
the GDP per capita (GDP per capita) and the bilateral trade with the lender’s country (Bilateral 
                                                 
8
 For example, although Citibank (the parent bank) is headquartered in the U.S., for loans provided by Citibank 
International Plc, we set the lender’s country as the UK. In sensitivity tests, we examine cases of cross-border loans 
where the lending bank has an affiliate or subsidiary in the borrower’s country, by identifying all banks’ 
subsidiaries/affiliates in the borrower’s country. Similarly, we further identify all firms’ subsidiaries/affiliates in the 
borrower’s country, although the number of these subsidiaries is relatively small. 
9
 Distinguishing between types of covenants (e.g., general and financial covenants) does not affect our results. 
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trade) to account for the economic development and the macroeconomic environment in the 
borrower’s country. Exact definitions of these variables are provided in Table A1 and summary 
statistics in Table 1. 
We also use loan type fixed effects; these are very important as loan facilities include credit 
lines and term loans, which have fundamental differences in their contractual arrangements and 
pricing (Berg, Saunders, and Steffen, 2016). We further include fixed effects based on the purpose 
of the loan (e.g., corporate purposes, working capital, takeovers or acquisitions, debt repayment, 
etc.). Importantly, we use year, bank, and firm fixed effects. This complements our bank- and firm-
level characteristics and allows us to control for general bank- and firm-side respectively 
explanations of our findings (such as differences in banks’ financial soundness, corporate 
governance, or in firms’ credit risk and performance), that are not isolated by the inclusion of our 
set of control variables. We further control for differences in the macroeconomic environment of 
the borrowers’ countries using borrower’s country fixed effects. These fixed effects saturate the 
effect of Vote on AISD from other country socioeconomic and political effects on bank lending.10 
In even more stringent specifications, we control for characteristics common to the firm’s 
industry that may affect firms within that industry equally (firm industry effects). We additionally 
control for forces stemming from the macroeconomic environment in the lender’s country 
(lender’s country effects), as well as differences between the given pair of lender’s and borrower’s 
countries (e.g., the exchange rate dynamics) through the use of country-pair effects. 
 
4. The Effect of Political Ties on the Cost of Credit 
                                                 
10
 These are country factors affecting all banks and firms within a country. Several studies examine such macro effects 
on international bank lending (e.g., Delis, Hasan, and Ongena, 2020; and the associated references), and in this study 
these effects are fully controlled for via the fixed effects.  
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4.1. Baseline results 
Table 2 reports the results of the estimation of Equation (1) using OLS and various fixed effects, 
including the coefficient estimates and t-statistics obtained from standard errors clustered by firm 
and year.11 In line with our discussion in Section 2, we consider different fixed effects. In column 
(1), we adopt the simplest of our set of fixed effects, namely year, bank, and firm fixed effects. In 
column (2), we introduce borrower’s country fixed effects that control for macroeconomic 
conditions in the country of the firm, while column (3) introduces loan type and loan purpose fixed 
effects. Next, we add lender’s country fixed effects, to capture the macroeconomic dynamics in 
the country of the bank in column (4). Column (5) includes are most demanding specification, 
since we further add firm industry, and country-pair fixed effects.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 Across all specifications, the general finding is that stronger voting similarity (as reflected 
in the coefficient of Vote) exerts a negative and statistically significant effect on loan spreads. We 
choose specification (2) as our baseline since it controls to a reasonable extent for changing bank 
and firm characteristics and the macroeconomic environment in the borrower’s country without 
being overburdened by fixed effects; furthermore, the results are similar to either the less or the 
more stringent specifications. The main coefficient of interest, 𝑎1, reveals that a one standard 
deviation increase in Vote decreases AISD by an average of 13.9 basis points (= 87.0 basis points × 0.16). 
Economically, this is a sizeable effect, equal to a 9.5% (= 13.9 basis points ÷ 147.1 basis 
points) decrease for the average loan amount in our sample. Given that the average loan size is 
USD 1.68 billion, firms from countries with strong voting similarity to the U.S. save approximately 
                                                 
11
 In the last row of each table, we report the number of banks and firms from which we obtain identification in the 
corresponding estimations. 
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USD 2.3 million (= USD 1.68 billion × 13.9 basis points) per year in foregone interest. For an 
average loan maturity of 4.4 years, this represents approximately USD 10.2 million in interest 
savings over the loan’s duration.12  
Since our voting similarity measure reflects the magnitude of a country’s political ties with 
the U.S., we expect the effect of Vote to be more pronounced for loans provided by U.S. banks. 
We examine this premise in Table 3, where we estimate our baseline regression by splitting our 
sample into loans from non-U.S. banks and U.S. banks (columns (1) and (2) respectively). The 
coefficients on Vote in either columns are very similar in magnitude and statistical significance 
with our baseline, pointing to minimal differences when distinguishing between the two lender 
types. 
Column (3) consequently examines the differential effect of Vote on loans granted by U.S. 
banks, by including the interaction of our voting measure with an indicator of whether the lead 
bank is headquartered in the U.S. (U.S. lender). Results from this column show that the coefficient 
on the main term of Vote is negative and statistically significant, albeit relatively lower than our 
baseline estimate. The rest of the effect is picked up by the double interaction term, which 
comprises approximately 22% of the overall effect. Most importantly, the combined effect of Vote 
on AISD (reflected in the sum of the coefficients on Vote and Vote × U.S. lender) is approximately 
14.9 basis points, only slightly higher than our baseline estimate. Interestingly, the coefficient on 
U.S. lender is not statistically significant, suggesting that loans from U.S. banks carry a lower 
interest rate only when granted to politically friendly countries.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
                                                 
12
 Assuming five annual payments and LIBOR as the discount rate, the increase in interest expense equals USD 9.7 
million for the average 12-month LIBOR rate of 2.1% during our sample period (for similar calculations, see Ivashina 
and Sun, 2011). 
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In Table A2 of the Appendix, we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to the “bad 
controls” problem, by interchangeably excluding loan-level control variables from our 
specifications.13 We initially omit all loan-level variables (column (1)) and sequentially introduce 
quantitative information on the loan (Loan amount, Maturity, Collateral, Number of lenders, 
Performance provisions and General covenants) in columns (2)-(4).14 Irrespective of the 
specifications used, the coefficient on Vote retains its negative and statistically significant 
coefficient confirming the lower cost of credit for firms headquartered in countries with close 
political ties to the U.S. 
In each of the columns of Table A3, we consider alternative versions of our principal voting 
similarity measure. Columns (1)-(2) include the non-normalized version of Vote (lagged and 
contemporaneous), while column (3) includes the 3-option version; results in either columns 
confirm their negative and statistically significant effect on AISD. This effect is further confirmed 
for the Thacker (1999) measure, as according to column (4), a one standard deviation increase in 
Vote with us raises loan spreads by 8.9%. 
The size and magnitude of coefficients on the control variables in Tables 2-4 are generally 
in line with expectations and the earlier works of Ivashina (2009), Bae and Goyal (2009), Cai, 
Saunders, and Steffen (2018), and Delis, Hasan, and Ongena (2020). In particular, loan spreads 
decrease with the loan amount and increase with maturity. The imposition of collateral further 
increases AISD as these loans are generally deemed to be riskier. Also, loans are more 
competitively priced when more lending banks are included in the syndicate. The non-significance 
of the bank-, and firm-level characteristics (with the exception of firm return on assets) is also 
                                                 
13
 Since the “bad controls” problem is due to differences in the composition of loans to a given firm, in an alternative 
sensitivity test we include weights based on the number and amount of loans received by each firm (results available 
upon request). 
14
 The replacement of General covenants with Financial covenants or Net covenants leaves our results unchanged. 
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anticipated, as it confirms that the reduction on the firm cost of credit is driven by something more 
than just conventional bank loan-supply or firm loan-demand considerations. Last, macro forces 
seem to be at play, since the higher the GDP growth in the borrower’s country and the stronger the 
trade relationship between the given country-pair, the lower the spread on loans directed to the 
borrower’s countries. 
 
4.2. Instrumental variables 
In this section we further test the robustness of our results using an IV method. Using a cross-
section of loans for multiple years limits the possibility of reverse causality or simultaneity: 
observing a change in Vote due to a change in loan spreads is highly unlikely, and even more so 
given our control variables and the fact that we have loan-level data. Identifying a causal relation 
running from Vote to AISD is still challenging due to the possible presence of unobserved 
characteristics of the borrower’s country that are correlated with both Vote and AISD. The 
inclusion of a number of different control variables, especially at the loan and country-levels in 
the previous section, should reduce this possibility. 
We nevertheless adopt a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) model, where in the first stage we 
regress our voting similarity measure on the determinants of a country voting in favor of U.S. 
proposals; these determinants include the level of U.S. aid towards the voting country, along with 
the country’s population, and country-level institutional characteristics, such as the legal origin 
and the degree of democracy (see Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele, 2008; Carter and Stone, 
2015). Given the construction of the instrument, the model takes the form: 
 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑘𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑘𝑡                                          (3) 
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In equation (3), Determinants of Vote is a vector of borrower’s country-level variables, 
namely the amount of economic aid by the U.S., the country’s population, the degree of democracy 
(as reflected in the country’s Polity score) and the legal origin (English common law, French 
commercial code, socialist/communist laws, etc.). The vector Controls includes borrower’s 
country-level controls, such as the level of political rights and civil liberties (Political rights and 
Civil liberties respectively), whether the recipient country has a formal alliance with the U.S. 
(Alliance) or common religion (Religion), and the country’s GDP growth (GDP growth) and GDP 
per capita (GDP per capita). In the second stage, we estimate equation (1) with the predicted 
values of Vote from the first stage, as our main explanatory variable. 
By employing this approach, we control for the support of U.S. proposals in the first stage 
of the model and further ensure the econometric efficiency of the estimates as second-stage results 
are usually associated with lower standard errors and lower coefficient estimates Our specification 
of equations (3) and (1) is a consistent IV model that has much better bias properties for our sample 
compared to the usual 2SLS model.15 A similar approach has been adopted in the recent works of 
Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, and Robinson (2019) and Delis, Hasan, and Ongena (2020).16  
To satisfy the exclusion restriction, this approach assumes that the determinants of a 
country’s voting in favor or U.S. proposals are not strongly related. In fact, U.S. aid to recipient 
countries varies in its influence on different regimes as a function of their domestic institutions, as 
U.S. policymakers are likely to consider a divergent set of factors with respect to awarding 
financial assistance (see Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz, 2009). As such, they may sometimes 
                                                 
15
 We further estimate a simple 2SLS however, we do not present the estimates for brevity (available on request). 
16
 The studies examine the effect of democratic development on economic growth and firm cost of credit respectively, 
using an IV termed “Regional democratization”. 
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choose to subordinate human rights and provide aid to non-democratic regimes with weak 
institutions and limited political and civil liberties in order to pursue more immediate stability or 
security interests. Furthermore, although legal origin is primarily responsible for the structure of 
the legal system and the centralization of justice, it is nevertheless unrelated to the country’s 
population or the U.S. aid received (see Chong, Gradstein, and Calderon, 2009). 
The system of equations (3) and (1) is not the usual 2SLS model given that not all variables 
of the second stage are included in the first stage. In a simple 2SLS model, where both the 
endogenous independent and the dependent variables are observed at the same level (e.g., at 
country-year), not including control variables in the first stage would be an omission, especially if 
these controls have any explanatory power on Vote. We nevertheless adopt this IV approach here 
since, given the multi-level nature of our sample, it is not likely that loan- and firm-level controls 
can significantly explain our voting similarity measure. 
In Table A4 of the Appendix, we present results from the first-stage, where we estimate 
different specifications of equation (3). We present estimates from the second-stage regressions in 
Table 4, where we estimate our baseline specification by replacing our baseline voting similarity 
measure with the predicted values from each of the specifications in the first stage. Across all 
specifications, a one standard deviation increase in Vote lowers spreads by 9.3-16.5 basis points. 
Regarding the rest of our control variables, their sign and significance is in line with our baseline 
estimates.17 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.3. Identification from war conflicts and geopolitical risks 
                                                 
17
 The standard deviation of our predicted voting measure from the first stage regressions ranges from 0.12 to 0.17. 
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Thus far, an implicit assumption in our identification strategy is that firms borrow at a lower 
interest rate if their sovereign of domicile is favorably disposed towards the U.S. However, this 
could be a temporary phenomenon mainly prevalent during periods of global tensions and 
conflicts, where the sovereigns can capitalize on their provision of voting support to the U.S. 
proposals. If these periods are prolonged and require the continuous support of the U.S. allies, we 
should observe a notable discount in the loans directed to these allies’ corporates during their 
duration. Nevertheless, borrowers may also receive a lower interest rate after the easing of these 
conflicts as an enticement to support U.S. proposals in future UN General Assemblies. In such a 
case, we should observe a fall in loan spreads in response to similar voting patterns over and above 
that observed during the duration of the conflict periods. 
To examine this contingency, we consider certain war conflicts. We focus on three major 
conflicts, namely the Afghanistan war of 2001, the Iraq war of 2003, and the Syria war of 2014.18 
In total, 2,844 loan facilities were granted during the course of these wars. If even after 
disentangling the effect of these war conflicts firms continue to receive more favorable loan 
spreads, this should be attributed to the strategic alliance between the sovereigns and the U.S. and 
not to a temporary reward in return for support during the war. We introduce these exogenous 
shocks into our model by interacting them with our voting similarity measure and present results 
in Table 5. These results essentially provide an even more stringent identification method, 
implying that during war conflicts our results must be stronger. 
                                                 
18
 Since the Afghanistan and Syrian wars are ongoing, and therefore extend during the best part of our sample period, 
they were characterized by different phases of varying intensity and escalation levels. It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that political ties primarily manifest through the support of U.S. proposals about the beginning and/or the 
intensification of military interventions during the major phases of the wars; this is further useful for identification 
purposes (for more details on the wars and their different phases and intensity levels, see the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program described in Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand, 2002). To determine the major phase 
of each war we resort to information provided by the Council of Foreign Relations and the content of the resolutions 
issued by the United Nations Security Council during the duration of the wars. 
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We first consider the Afghanistan war, where 1,444 loan facilities were extended during 
the major phase of the war. From the estimates in column (1), it is evident that this period is 
associated with lower firm borrowing costs: the coefficient on Vote × Afghanistan war is negative 
and statistically significant. The additional interest rate savings amount to approximately 2.8 basis 
points following a one standard deviation increase in our voting similarity measure. What matters 
is that this discount is independent of the lower interest rate charged during the non-war period: 
the coefficient on Vote, remains statistically significant and within the range suggested by our 
baseline estimates. We consequently examine the effect of political ties on borrowing costs during 
the onset of the Iraq war. During the main stage of this war, firms received 351 syndicated loan 
facilities. According to the coefficient on our double interaction term (column (2)), these facilities 
carried an additional 6.2 bps lower spread than those received in the non-episode period. This is 
almost 44% of the discount received during normal times.  
Our next conflict concerns the Syria war, in the course of which firms received 1,400 loan 
facilities. As column (3) reveals, these facilities carried an interest rate discount approximately 8 
times the discount carried in normal times (coefficients on Vote × Syria war and Vote respectively). 
Last, in specification (4), we examine the overall effect of all wars occurring during our sample 
period. Again, this combined episode translates into a 7.1 basis points decrease in the loan spreads, 
or 48% of the regular decrease in calm periods (coefficients on the double interaction term and the 
main term respectively). Overall, while these exogenous war conflicts were associated with 
discounted interest rate loans granted to corporates domiciled in countries with similar voting 
patterns to the U.S., results in this section suggest that these patterns have a persistent effect that 
extends to non-war periods. 
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We further examine the effect of general geopolitical risks on our results, hypothesizing 
that in times of rising geopolitical uncertainty the effect of political ties on loan spreads is stronger. 
Relative to the examination of war conflicts, geopolitical risk is the broader risk associated with 
wars, terrorist acts, and tensions between states that affect the normal and peaceful course of 
international relations. Geopolitical risk reflects both the risk that these events materialize, and the 
new risks associated with an escalation of existing events (such as wars or military interventions). 
To examine this premise, in Table 6 we interact our voting similarity measure with the geopolitical 
risk index of Caldara and Iacoviello (2018).19 To allow for the direct interpretation of the 
coefficient estimates on both the interaction terms and the main terms, we mean-center the 
variables included in the interaction terms. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Considering geopolitical tensions does not change our inferences about the effect of 
political ties on loan spreads: a one standard deviation increase in our voting similarity measure 
raises spreads by 14.3 basis points, an estimate very close to our baseline regression (coefficient 
on Vote in column (1)). However, this effect is magnified in the presence of geopolitical tensions. 
The coefficient on Vote × Geopolitical risk suggests that when adverse geopolitical events trigger 
an increase in geopolitical risk, firms in countries with closer political ties to the U.S. are able to 
receive even cheaper loans relative to times when geopolitical risk is contained: a one standard 
deviation increase in Geopolitical risk decreases spreads by an additional 2.0 basis points for loans 
to firms in these countries. We obtain similar results in columns (2)-(3), where we focus on the 
                                                 
19
 The geopolitical risk index is constructed by counting the number of occurrences in leading English-language 
newspapers of articles discussing geopolitical events and associated risks. In particular, the baseline geopolitical risk 
index is constructed starting in 1985 by running automated text-searches of the electronic archives available on 
ProQuest Newsstream of 11 newspapers: The Boston Globe, the Chicago Tribune, The Daily Telegraph, the Financial 
Times, The Globe and Mail, The Guardian, the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Times, The Wall 
Street Journal, and the Washington Post. More information on the construction of the index is available in Caldara 
and Iacoviello (2018). 
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decomposition of the geopolitical risk index into its threats (column (2)) and acts (column (3)) 
components. 
 
4.4. Political conditions in the U.S. 
Having established the added importance of similar voting patterns during war periods, we now 
turn our focus to political conditions in the U.S. Our approach is two-fold: a) to examine whether 
the easing effect of voting patterns on loan spreads is further reinforced when certain political 
parties are in power and b) to identify the potential effect of the political cycle. To accomplish this, 
we estimate specifications including the double interactions of our voting similarity measure with 
indicators for whether Republicans or Democrats are in power (Republican party) and whether 
federal elections are held in the year (U.S. elections) respectively. We present results in Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
As column (1) reveals, the effect of Vote on loan spreads is more pronounced under 
Republican administration: approximately 42% of the overall effect of Vote (consisting of the sum 
of the main term and the double interaction) stems from the double interaction term; furthermore, 
this overall effect exceeds our baseline estimates, pointing to a 17.8 bps spread discount in 
response to a one standard deviation increase in our voting similarity measure. However, this effect 
is not contingent on the phase of the political cycle: although the coefficient on the main term is 
similar in sign, magnitude and statistical significance to our baseline, the coefficient on Vote × 
U.S. election fails to reach statistical significance at conventional levels (column (2)). 
 
4.5. Additional results 
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An extension of our empirical analysis relates to the role of loan fees, since we might expect that 
closer political ties reduce the cost of loans through lower fees. However, data on fees is generally 
limited since several loans (especially outside the U.S.) are term loans that have limited fees. 
Nevertheless, in Table A5 we replicate Table 2 with AISU as the dependent variable. Across all 
specifications, we do not observe a statistically significant effect of Vote on AISU. Thus, it seems 
that voting similarity is only priced in spreads. 
Further, to make sure that our inferences are not sensitive to the type of clustering (also 
given the multi-level and multi-country nature of our data), we also cluster standard errors by 
borrower’s country and year, borrower’s country and firm, bank and year, bank and firm, and 
borrower’s country and lender’s country (see Table A6). Results are similar to the baseline. 
Our OLS estimations thus far, have assumed that all loans enter the model with equal 
weights. Normally, the different fixed effects in Table 2 provide a safeguard against cross-country 
variation. We nevertheless acknowledge that the empirical specification might leave the analysis 
open to the critique that countries receiving fewer loans might affect our results disproportionately. 
To this end, we re-estimate our preferred model specification using weighted least squares and 
several different weights. The results in Table A7 are almost identical to our baseline. 
Thus far our results could be subject to a sample-selection bias, in the sense that the 
variables driving our findings might further determine the firm’s decision to receive a loan from 
the particular bank. It may be, for instance, that the impact of a country’s political ties to the U.S. 
on loan contracting is due to firms in this country being the ones more likely to request a loan. To 
eliminate this potential selection bias from our estimates, we follow Dass and Massa (2011) and 
employ Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model to calculate the probability of a firm entering into a 
loan deal. In the first stage, we run a probit model to estimate the firm’s loan-taking decision. 
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During this stage, our loan sample is extended and includes all syndicated loan facilities available 
in Dealscan. We calculate Heckman’s lambda (inverse mills ratio) and include it as an additional 
control variable in the second-stage OLS estimation of specifications (1)-(3) of Table A8. 
 In line with Dass and Massa (2011), we assume that the borrower’s decision to get a 
syndicated loan is a function of the main determinants of the decision to borrow in general. 
Consequently, our probit regression is augmented with a set of loan-, bank-, and firm-level 
characteristics; a set of weights for the number, origin, and direction of loans made in a given year; 
loan type, year, bank, firm, and borrower’s country dummies. Our set of annual weights include 
the number of loans by a given bank (Bank loans), the number of loans to a given firm (Firm 
loans), and the number of loans between a given bank-firm pair (Bank-firm loans). 
We present results from this exercise in columns (1)-(3) of Table A8 (Panels A and B). 
Probit estimates (columns (1)-(3) of Panel A), indicate that the higher the firm’s return on assets 
and the greater (lower) reliance on debt (equity financing), the more likely is the completion of a 
syndicated loan deal. Loans of a greater amount and shorter maturity are more likely to be granted, 
particularly when these loans include many lenders, are secured, and carry pricing provisions and 
covenants. Most importantly, estimates from the second-stage regressions (columns (1)-(3) of 
Panel B) confirm the strong negative impact of our voting similarity measure on AISD (as reflected 
in the coefficient on Vote).  
Further, we control for changes in the firm’s fundamentals as well as differences in the 
macroeconomic, financial, and institutional environment in the borrowers’ country. Specifically, 
we include additional firm controls (leverage, asset growth, retained earnings, credit ratings), a 
number of macroeconomic and institutional controls (debt-to-GDP ratio, price level, balance of 
trade, prevalence of democratic institutions, interbank market conditions, etc.), general economic 
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controls (global stock price volatility), etc. These variables (especially the macroeconomic ones) 
should correlate strongly with the borrower’s country fixed effects, to the extent that these 
variables change slowly over time. We do not use all indicators at once, because they tend to have 
high pairwise correlations. Again, the results in Table A9 confirm our baseline estimates on the 
effect of Vote on loan spreads. 
Finally, in Table A10 we examine the response of the remaining loan terms. Although there 
is evidence that an increase in Vote enables firms to obtain longer maturity loans (column 2), other 
terms, such as the loan amount (column 1), or the decision on the imposition of collateral and 
covenants (columns 3 and 4 respectively) do not appear to be affected by our voting similarity 
measure. 
 
5. Analyzing the mechanisms 
Thus far, our analysis points to the discounting effect of a country’s voting of the U.S. proposals 
on the cost of loans granted to that country’s firms. In this section, we identify the mechanisms 
through which similar voting patterns materialize into lower firm borrowing costs. 
 
5.1 Exploring the mechanisms: Borrower fundamentals 
The present section considers alternative demand-side explanations of our findings and identifies 
certain firm traits that act as drivers of our results. To this end, Table 8 includes the interaction of 
Vote with a number of different firm characteristics reflecting the firm’s size, profitability, capital 
structure and operating performance. Specification (1) reveals that the effect of voting patterns on 
firm cost of credit is concentrated in large borrowers. Moreover, this effect is magnified for 
profitable firms: a one-standard deviation increase in the firm’s return on assets saves the firm an 
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additional 2.75 basis points on top of the savings due to a similarity in voting patterns (coefficients 
on Vote × Firm ROA and Vote respectively). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
The next two specifications consider the firm’s decision with regards to its capital structure. 
Estimates point to a negative relationship between firm use of equity capital and loan spreads, as 
better capitalized firms face lower borrowing costs; however greater reliance on debt financing 
exerts the opposite effect, thereby increasing the firm’s interest burden (coefficients on double 
interactions in specifications 3 and 4 respectively). From a similar perspective, firms with greater 
asset growth and retained earnings further manage to extend the interest savings due to similar 
voting patterns (coefficients on double interactions in specifications 5 and 6 respectively). This is 
intuitive, since less reliance on external financing and greater reliance on own funds lowers firm 
borrowing costs ceteris paribus; as results from columns (3)-(6) reveal, this mechanism is further 
operative when considered along voting pattern similarity. 
 
5.2. Exploring the mechanisms: Government-owned banks 
A further potential mechanism, through which similar voting patterns translate into lower 
loan spreads is through government-owned banks. In fact, politically connected banks are more 
suited to follow government guidelines and support the targets of administration (see, e.g., 
Sapienza, 2004; Brei and Schclarek, 2013). Their government ownership further enables them to 
attract deposits more easily than their non-connected counterparts; thus, state-owned banks are 
more likely to charge lower interest rates relative to private banks (see, e.g., Ferri, Kalmi, and 
Kerola, 2014; Nys, Tarazi, and Trinugroho, 2015). Due to their exclusive relationship with the 
government and their easier access to financial resources at more convenient conditions, we expect 
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that the effect of political ties on loan spreads is stronger for loans granted by government-owned 
banks relative to non-government owned ones. We examine this premise by interacting our voting 
similarity measure with indicators about the presence of government banks in the syndicate and 
present results in Table 9. Furthermore, since lead banks are responsible for the initial negotiations 
with the borrowing firm, the setting of the loan terms, and monitoring the loan facility after its 
origination (see Ivashina, 2009), we distinguish lead arrangers from participant banks.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
As column (1) suggests, the response of loan spreads to an increase in our voting similarity 
measure is not contingent on the inclusion of government participant banks in the syndicate 
(coefficient on double interaction); moreover, this result is not dependent on whether the 
participant bank is based in the U.S. (coefficient on triple interaction in column (2)). Results are 
very different, when we consider the presence of lead arrangers. In specific, the inclusion of at 
least one government lead bank in the syndicate results in a decrease in the loan spreads over and 
above the decrease attributed to a rise in voting similarity (coefficient on Vote × Government lead). 
This decrease is further magnified when U.S. lead banks enter the syndicate (coefficient on Vote 
× Government lead × U.S. lender in column (2)). 
 
5.3. Exploring the mechanisms: Relationship lending 
Our results thus far highlight an important competitive advantage of firms in countries with close 
political ties to the U.S. However, the operation of the political ties channel bypasses the traditional 
bank-firm interplay which is primary responsible during the loan negotiation process. In that sense, 
political ties might coexist with alternative factors that minimize information asymmetry between 
the bank-firm pair and determine loan spreads. Such an important factor is relationship lending. 
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Prior lending relationships allow lenders to acquire valuable information about the borrowing 
firm’s operations and credit risk. It is reasonable to expect that firms with prior lending ties with 
their banks might be able to enjoy lower loan spreads relative to first-time borrowers. Nevertheless, 
this should be an effect over and above that attributed to close political ties between their countries 
of domicile and the U.S. We test this hypothesis in Table 10, by interacting our variables of main 
interest with Lending relationship, a variable reflecting the existence of a prior lending relationship 
between the given bank-firm pair over the previous 2-year period (see, e.g., Bharath, Dahiya, 
Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2009; Dass and Massa, 2011).  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 Estimates in column (1) suggest that relationship borrowers are able to save approximately 
3.8 basis points (coefficient on Vote × Lending relationship). Most importantly, these savings are 
on top of the spread discount due to their countries’ similar voting patterns; the latter is reflected 
in the coefficient on Vote and it is within the range suggested by our baseline estimates. The 
offsetting effect of relationship lending further increases with the size and magnitude of this 
relationship: the greater the number or the amount of loans between the given bank-firm pair 
during the previous 2-year period, the greater the interest rate savings for the borrowing firms 
(coefficients on double interaction terms in columns (2)-(3)). 
 
5.4 Exploring the mechanisms: Country relationships 
Consequently, we investigate the possibility that firms gain access to lower borrowing costs due 
to continuous and established relationships that in turn drive voting pattern similarity. To this end, 
in Table 11 we interact our voting similarity measure with a number of indicators reflecting the 
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alliance and (in)direct contiguity relationships between the borrower’s countries and the U.S. (see 
Stinnett, Tir, Diehl, Schafer, and Gochman, 2002). 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Estimates from column (1) suggest that formal alliances do not constitute a contributing 
factor to the firms’ lower cost of credit (coefficient on Vote × Alliance). This primarily owes to the 
strong presence of firms headquartered in countries classified as allies of the U.S., as more than 
90% of loans in our sample are extended to these countries’ firms. Intuitively, voting similarity 
should matter more when allied countries confirm their alliance in practice by, among other, 
providing support to U.S. proposals. Furthermore, the response of loan spreads to voting similarity 
is not intensified by the existence of shared borders between the borrowers’ countries or their 
colonies and the U.S. (double interactions in columns (2) and (3) respectively) or the presence of 
religion ties between them (double interaction in column (4)). Importantly, across all specifications 
the effect of Vote on AISD is at least similar if not stronger, to that suggested by our baseline. 
 
5.5 Exploring the mechanisms: Cross-listing and institutional investors 
Having demonstrated the easing effect of close political ties on firm cost of credit, we ultimately 
examine whether the ability to access alternative sources of financing and attract institutional 
investors relieves firms of the need to rely on this effect. In line with our analysis of the relevant 
mechanisms, in this subsection we interact our voting similarity measure with a number of 
variables reflecting the firms’ cross-listing status and the level of institutional ownership in the 
borrowers’ countries. A listing on a foreign stock exchange presents the issuing firm with an 
incentive to commit to providing higher quality financial information and exposes the company to 
further scrutiny of reputable intermediaries (Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Shi, Magnan, and 
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Kim, 2012). As a result, the firm will expose itself to higher disclosure standards and provide 
credible information to market participants. This is further driven by the dual pressures from both 
host and home countries’ stock exchanges that cross-listed firms face, which in turn make them 
more adept at attracting alternative sources of financing (see Hillman and Wan, 2005). Similarly, 
cross-listed firms benefit in the product market by releasing more information to foreign markets; 
this product market internationalization translates into a higher likelihood that managers will issue 
forecasts, thereby minimizing the information asymmetry about their future prospects and 
performance (see Saudagaran, 1988).  
For these reasons, we expect that cross-listed firms rely less – if at all – on the easing effect 
exerted by their home countries’ voting patterns on their borrowing costs relative to domestically 
listed companies. Their global outreach and superior network combined with their effective 
monitoring, provides the former type of firms with a comparative advantage that renders them 
insensitive to their countries’ voting decisions. We examine this premise in columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 7, where we interact Vote with an indicator of a firm’s cross-listed status. Results from 
column (1), suggest that the effect of Vote on AISD is largely mitigated for cross-listed firms: the 
coefficient on the double interaction is positive and statistically significant and approximately 55% 
of the coefficient on the main term of Vote. Furthermore, the reversal effect of the cross-listing 
status is magnified for firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges (in addition to their domestic stock 
exchange): for the latter, the effect of Vote is entirely reversed (coefficient on Vote × Cross-listed 
in U.S. in column (2)). It appears that although an increase in voting similarity results in lower 
spreads for the borrowing firms, this does not apply to firms listed in multiple stock exchanges. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
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We consequently examine the role of institutional quality, since strong institutions and the 
ability to attract institutional investors are largely considered a driving force shaping firm 
performance and borrowing costs (see, among others, Qian and Strahan, 2007; Qi, Roth, and Wald, 
2010). In fact, their presence may reduce firm cost of credit as firms with greater proportions of 
institutional investors are likely to have lower agency costs due to better monitoring. This in turn 
alleviates the need for banks to engage in heavy monitoring, thereby passing the savings to the 
borrowing firms in the form of lower interest rates (see Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Dyck, Lins, 
Roth, and Wagner, 2019). On the same line, firms that are closely monitored by institutions are 
generally more profitable and less risky. As such, we expect that greater institutional investor 
involvement provides a positive signal to the lending banks, thereby relieving firms of the need to 
rely on political ties to obtain favorable loan rates.  
We test this conjecture by distinguishing between countries located in the top 25th 
percentile of our sample in terms of institutional quality and protection. In specific, we consider 
the extent of firm disclosure intensity, the strength of investor protection, and the strength of legal 
rights, and interact the relevant binary indicators with our voting similarity measure (columns (3), 
(4) and (5) respectively). Across all specifications, we observe that the effect of Vote is largely 
reversed – and even revoked – for countries in the top band of institutional scores (coefficients on 
double interactions). We conclude that in countries with strong presence of institutional investors 
and strong institutional environment, the support of U.S. proposals does not constitute an effective 
mechanism for lowering domestic firms’ loan spreads.  
Overall, the results of this section suggest that the effect of stronger political ties between 
the borrower’s country and the U.S. is not symmetric across all borrowing firms. It is mainly 
concentrated in firms listed only in their domestic stock exchange, and in countries with weak 
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institutional quality that prevents the participation of institutional investors. On the other hand, 
firms with alternative financing sources and ability to attract foreign institutional investors are less 
likely to be affected irrespective of how their country of domicile votes. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This article expands the literature on the extent of international political-economic linkages in 
cross-border financing by investigating the effects of state-to-state political ties with a global 
superpower, the United States, on the pricing of international syndicated bank loans. We find that 
stronger state political ties between the U.S. and the government of a borrower's home country, 
measured through voting similarity at the United Nations General Assembly, is associated with 
lower borrowing costs and is stronger when lead arrangers are U.S. banks, during periods in which 
the U.S. is engaged in armed conflicts such as in the Afghan, Iraq and Syrian wars, when the U.S. 
president belongs to the Republican party, and for borrowers with better balance sheets and prior 
lending relationships. These results parallel the literature on the socio-cultural determinants of 
cross-border debt pricing as well as the documented effect of state political ties on international 
bond pricing in the literature.  
Even for countries in support of U.S. proposals, we find that not all firms benefit from the 
exploitation of closer political ties to obtain lower loans spreads. The financing flexibility and 
constant communication with market participants that is associated with listing in multiple 
exchanges allows cross-listed firms to rely less – if at all – on the easing effect of their countries’ 
voting patterns. From a similar perspective, firms operating in countries with strong institutional 
environment that can attract institutional investors are less likely to resort to political ties as a 
means for lowering their borrowing costs. 
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 It should be noted that our results are historical in nature and depend on qualitative features 
of foreign relations and U.S. foreign policy. While voting patterns at the United Nations has been 
found useful and informative for measuring political ties in the literature, it is by no means an all-
encompassing measure of international foreign relations. Dramatic upheavals and shifts in 
qualitative factors regarding political relationships not captured by voting patterns at the United 
Nations could change the implications of the results we document in this paper. Understanding the 
additional implications of these, perhaps using a more nuanced measure of state-level political ties, 
is left for future work.
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
The table reports summary statistics (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) for 
all variables used in the estimations of the main text. All variables are defined in Table A1.  
 
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
AISD 10,472 147.06 132.11 1.00 1,175.00 
AISU 3,437 28.75 28.63 1.00 300.00 
Vote 10,472 0.69 0.16 0.25 1.00 
Vote (non-normalized) 10,472 0.49 0.27 -0.23 1.00 
Vote (non-normalized current) 10,472 0.54 0.26 -0.23 1.00 
Vote (3-option) 10,472 0.61 0.15 0.19 1.00 
Vote with us 8,118 0.69 0.11 0.37 0.92 
Loan amount 10,472 20.38 1.42 11.07 24.41 
Loan amount (USD million) 10,472 1,680.00 2,800.00 0.06 39,900.00 
Maturity (months) 10,472 52.49 29.82 2.00 515.00 
Collateral 10,472 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 10,472 17.27 13.03 1.00 94.00 
Number of leads 10,472 9.56 7.86 1.00 44.00 
Performance provisions 10,472 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
General covenants 10,472 0.24 0.75 0.00 6.00 
Financial covenants 10,472 0.22 0.69 0.00 6.00 
Net covenants 10,472 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Bank share 10,467 0.13 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Herfindahl 10,467 1,250.19 1,745.81 0.00 10,000.00 
Government lead 10,208 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Government participant 10,208 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Lending relationship 10,472 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Lending relationship number 10,472 0.06 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Lending relationship amount 10,439 0.06 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Bank size 10,472 14.17 0.66 10.03 15.14 
Bank ROA 10,472 0.20 0.52 -0.84 2.21 
Bank NPLs 10,472 0.83 1.82 0.00 8.88 
Firm size 10,472 9.64 1.70 1.30 15.18 
Firm ROA 10,472 0.07 0.06 -0.78 0.48 
Firm equity 10,472 8.42 1.90 0.75 15.55 
Firm debt 10,472 0.33 0.16 0.00 0.95 
Firm asset growth 10,157 0.07 0.28 -4.99 4.66 
Firm retained earnings 10,451 0.11 0.22 -2.70 1.44 
Cross-listed 10,362 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Cross-listed in U.S. 10,362 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
GDP growth 10,472 1.94 2.21 -9.13 26.28 
GDP per capita 10,472 44,996.14 14,022.69 6,930.74 111,069.20 
Bilateral trade 10,472 75,929.84 116,355.50 0.00 666,543.30 
Geopolitical risk 10,472 90.21 60.39 23.70 545.09 
Geopolitical risk (threats) 10,472 91.93 64.96 20.23 602.45 
Geopolitical risk (acts) 10,472 80.71 59.63 18.48 496.89 
Republican party 10,472 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
U.S. elections 10,285 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Alliance 10,472 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 
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Direct contiguity 10,472 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Dependency contiguity 7,974 4.05 3.47 1.00 9.00 
Religion 10,472 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Disclosure 6,963 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Investor protection 5,941 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Legal rights 6,773 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2. Baseline results with different fixed effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, 
as given in the last part of the table. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vote -81.489** -86.983** -83.910** -85.905** -82.360** 
 [-2.474] [-2.325] [-2.462] [-2.541] [-2.343] 
Loan amount -9.199*** -6.849** -8.549*** -8.661*** -8.692*** 
 [-2.919] [-2.491] [-3.546] [-3.616] [-3.411] 
Maturity 0.274** 0.283** 0.330** 0.326** 0.339** 
 [2.274] [2.587] [2.396] [2.348] [2.522] 
Collateral 47.929*** 47.390*** 33.396*** 33.283*** 29.846*** 
 [3.957] [4.076] [3.239] [3.245] [3.173] 
Number of lenders -0.786*** -0.683*** -0.533** -0.532** -0.514** 
 [-3.158] [-2.963] [-2.463] [-2.428] [-2.545] 
Performance provisions -4.912 -5.696 -4.607 -4.527 -6.003 
 [-0.918] [-0.968] [-1.172] [-1.156] [-1.578] 
General covenants 3.438 3.770 6.942** 6.856** 6.909** 
 [1.128] [1.235] [2.218] [2.193] [2.147] 
Bank size -9.642 -9.146 -1.414 -2.836 -2.507 
 [-1.328] [-1.251] [-0.214] [-0.424] [-0.404] 
Bank ROA -0.639 -0.585 2.369 2.123 1.909 
 [-0.177] [-0.156] [0.714] [0.654] [0.646] 
Bank NPLs -0.597 -0.561 -0.279 -0.346 -0.182 
 [-1.064] [-1.044] [-0.495] [-0.598] [-0.362] 
Firm size -8.008 -4.850 -9.437 -9.936 -9.856 
 [-0.930] [-0.620] [-1.247] [-1.304] [-1.387] 
Firm ROA -260.261*** -271.990*** -237.271*** -234.923*** -247.095*** 
 [-3.855] [-4.232] [-4.450] [-4.391] [-4.593] 
Firm equity -5.559 -6.684 -3.179 -2.881 -1.569 
 [-0.889] [-1.106] [-0.527] [-0.477] [-0.276] 
Firm debt 55.009 54.398 13.588 14.515 20.053 
 [1.585] [1.574] [0.407] [0.436] [0.629] 
GDP growth -5.107*** -4.759** -4.295** -4.239** -4.294** 
 [-3.534] [-2.639] [-2.413] [-2.394] [-2.540] 
GDP per capita 0.003* 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [1.999] [0.141] [-0.668] [-0.701] [-0.744] 
Bilateral trade -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 [-2.604] [-2.125] [-1.795] [-1.321] [-1.261] 
Constant 538.413*** 564.778*** 581.859*** 610.481*** 594.074*** 
 [3.870] [3.784] [4.422] [4.536] [4.651] 
Observations 10,479 10,479 10,472 10,472 10,427 
Adj. R-squared 0.699 0.708 0.766 0.767 0.773 
Loan type N N Y Y Y 
Loan purpose N N Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm industry effects N N N N Y 
Lender's country effects N N N Y Y 
Borrower's country effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-pair effects N N N N Y 
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Table 3. Non-U.S. loans vs U.S. loans 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Specification (1) includes loans granted only from non-
U.S. lenders (Non-U.S. loans). Specification (2) includes loans granted only from U.S. lenders (U.S. loans). Specification (3) includes 
the interaction of Vote with U.S. lender, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the lender is from the U.S., otherwise zero. The *, **, 
and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
(1) 
Non-U.S. loans 
(2) 
U.S. loans 
(3) 
All loans 
Vote -85.549** -90.073** -73.038** 
 [-2.107] [-2.569] [-2.191] 
Vote × U.S. lender   -20.170** 
   [-2.526] 
U.S. lender   4.171 
 
  [0.550] 
Loan amount -6.794** -6.722** -8.560*** 
 [-2.765] [-2.124] [-3.555] 
Maturity 0.253* 0.543** 0.329** 
 [1.913] [2.416] [2.392] 
Collateral 37.323*** 20.797* 33.450*** 
 [3.411] [1.736] [3.246] 
Number of lenders -0.429* -0.582** -0.532** 
 [-1.986] [-2.160] [-2.472] 
Performance provisions -3.285 -4.535 -4.616 
 [-0.621] [-1.205] [-1.176] 
General covenants 5.348 7.973** 6.944** 
 [1.360] [2.586] [2.248] 
Bank size -1.009 -11.798 -0.784 
 [-0.159] [-0.640] [-0.114] 
Bank ROA 9.740 4.623 1.296 
 [0.264] [0.871] [0.382] 
Bank NPLs -0.270 0.461 -0.339 
 [-0.360] [0.202] [-0.574] 
Firm size -11.170 -0.415 -9.491 
 [-1.168] [-0.047] [-1.250] 
Firm ROA -316.692*** -176.981*** -238.229*** 
 [-5.383] [-3.064] [-4.498] 
Firm equity 4.790 -10.877* -3.056 
 [0.620] [-1.981] [-0.505] 
Firm debt 24.511 -12.632 13.185 
 [0.663] [-0.279] [0.396] 
GDP growth -5.500** -3.301* -4.298** 
 [-2.414] [-2.063] [-2.410] 
GDP per capita -0.003 0.000 -0.001 
 [-1.412] [-0.079] [-0.635] 
Bilateral trade 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [1.043] [-1.297] [-1.137] 
Constant 586.064*** 625.019* 566.912*** 
 [4.496] [1.973] [4.307] 
Observations 5,414 4,890 10,472 
Adj. R-squared 0.793 0.754 0.766 
Loan type Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
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Firm effects Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y 
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Table 4. IV regressions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. The 
estimation method is the IV procedure of equations (3) and (1). Each specification presents estimates from the 2nd-stage regressions 
with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the last part of 
the table. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vote -79.013** -99.125*** -60.366** -93.853*** 
 [-2.160] [-3.936] [-2.172] [-3.062] 
Loan amount -4.707* -4.548* -4.762* -4.567* 
 [-1.916] [-1.827] [-1.946] [-1.835] 
Maturity 0.244 0.245 0.248* 0.245 
 [1.703] [1.692] [1.723] [1.697] 
Collateral 30.118* 31.431** 29.447* 31.210** 
 [2.062] [2.143] [2.019] [2.132] 
Number of lenders -0.743** -0.722** -0.747** -0.725** 
 [-2.260] [-2.135] [-2.271] [-2.141] 
Performance provisions -1.685 -1.211 -0.926 -1.142 
 [-0.302] [-0.216] [-0.165] [-0.204] 
General covenants 3.571 3.459 3.538 3.406 
 [1.055] [1.004] [1.038] [0.998] 
Bank size -8.854 -8.860 -8.923 -8.861 
 [-1.119] [-1.112] [-1.126] [-1.114] 
Bank ROA 6.199 7.107* 6.512 6.906 
 [1.480] [1.758] [1.561] [1.699] 
Bank NPLs -0.185 -0.033 -0.184 -0.051 
 [-0.251] [-0.044] [-0.249] [-0.069] 
Firm size -21.886* -20.466* -22.058* -20.710* 
 [-2.051] [-1.916] [-2.051] [-1.940] 
Firm ROA -322.045*** -309.395*** -320.087*** -312.441*** 
 [-4.617] [-4.403] [-4.571] [-4.452] 
Firm equity 8.008 7.080 8.032 7.182 
 [0.902] [0.792] [0.901] [0.804] 
Firm debt 20.014 25.580 21.669 24.237 
 [0.554] [0.690] [0.595] [0.654] 
GDP growth -5.473** -5.568** 4.292 4.076 
 [-2.137] [-2.116] [0.768] [1.189] 
GDP per capita 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 [0.273] [0.300] [0.478] [-0.151] 
Bilateral trade -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
 [-1.850] [-1.871] [-1.842] [-1.878] 
Constant 2,135.004** 2,592.391*** 1,707.306** 2,525.199*** 
 [2.763] [5.127] [2.708] [4.103] 
Observations 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 
Adj. R-squared 0.781 0.781 0.780 0.780 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower's country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table 5. Identification from war episodes 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined 
in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. In specification (1), 
Vote is interacted with Afghanistan war, i.e., a binary variable equal to one for the period covering the main period 
of the Afghanistan war (i.e., from the fourth quarter of 2001 until the second quarter of 2005), otherwise zero. In 
specification (2), Vote is interacted with Iraq war, i.e., a binary variable equal to one for the period covering the 
main period of the Iraq war (i.e., from the first quarter of 2003 until the second quarter of 2003), otherwise zero. In 
specification (3), Vote is interacted with Syria war, i.e., a binary variable equal to one for the period covering the 
main period of the Syria war (i.e., from the fourth quarter of 2014 until the fourth quarter of 2016), otherwise zero. 
In specification (4), Vote is interacted with All wars, i.e., a binary variable equal to one for the period covering the 
main period of the Afghanistan war, the Iraq war, and the Syria war (i.e., if any of Afghanistan war, Iraq war, or 
Syria war are equal to one), otherwise zero. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vote -85.234** -89.151** -109.301*** -93.246** 
 [-2.457] [-2.629] [-3.443] [-2.637] 
Vote × Afghanistan war -17.794*    
 [-2.025]    
Vote × Iraq war  -38.911**   
  [-2.232]   
Vote × Syria war   -917.353**  
   [-2.039]  
Vote × All wars    -44.358* 
 
   [1.901] 
Observations 10,472 10,472 10,472 10,472 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.766 0.767 0.766 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table 6. Geopolitical risk 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all 
variables are defined in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered 
by firm and year. In specification (1), Vote is interacted with Geopolitical risk, i.e., an indicator 
of geopolitical risk by Caldara and Iacoviello (2018). In specification (2), Vote is interacted with 
Geopolitical risk (threats), i.e., Geopolitical risk decomposed into threats components. In 
specification (3), Vote is interacted with Geopolitical risk (acts), i.e., Geopolitical risk 
decomposed into acts components. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Vote -89.187** -90.226** -84.480** 
 [-2.596] [-2.630] [-2.414] 
Vote × Geopolitical risk -0.205*   
 [-1.718]   
Vote × Geopolitical risk (threats)  -0.188*  
  [-1.772]  
Vote × Geopolitical risk (acts)   -0.285** 
   [-2.203] 
Observations 10,472 10,472 10,472 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.767 0.766 
Full set of controls Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y 
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Table 7. U.S. political conditions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable 
is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. The estimation method is 
OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. In specification (1), Vote 
is interacted with Republican party, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the 
incumbent U.S. President comes from the Republican party in the year before 
the loan facility origination date, otherwise zero. In specification (2), Vote is 
interacted with U.S. elections, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if elections are 
held in the U.S. in the year before the loan facility origination date, otherwise 
zero. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Vote -64.123* -96.019** 
 [-2.054] [-2.595] 
Vote × Republican party -46.965**  
 [-2.295]  
Vote × U.S. elections  1.024 
  [0.171] 
Loan amount -8.532*** -8.163*** 
 [-3.543] [-3.322] 
Maturity 0.330** 0.364** 
 [2.389] [2.480] 
Collateral 33.406*** 33.005*** 
 [3.246] [3.143] 
Number of lenders -0.534** -0.569** 
 [-2.468] [-2.461] 
Performance provisions -4.518 -4.076 
 [-1.163] [-1.026] 
General covenants 6.997** 6.704** 
 [2.235] [2.104] 
Bank size -1.346 -1.561 
 [-0.203] [-0.236] 
Bank ROA 1.720 3.603 
 [0.526] [1.096] 
Bank NPLs -0.251 -0.196 
 [-0.443] [-0.343] 
Firm size -9.899 -6.979 
 [-1.320] [-0.866] 
Firm ROA -239.558*** -240.179*** 
 [-4.506] [-4.277] 
Firm equity -2.837 -2.859 
 [-0.471] [-0.418] 
Firm debt 15.113 12.085 
 [0.455] [0.356] 
GDP growth -4.362** -4.203** 
 [-2.446] [-2.218] 
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.002 
 [-0.736] [-0.786] 
Bilateral trade -0.000** -0.000* 
 [-2.087] [-1.783] 
Constant 589.103*** 578.461*** 
 [4.458] [4.196] 
Observations 10,472 10,472 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.767 
Loan type Y Y 
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Loan purpose Y Y 
Year effects Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y 
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Table 8. Exploring the mechanisms: the loan-demand channel 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, 
as given in the lower part of the table. In specification (1), we interact Vote with Firm size, i.e., the log of total firm assets. In 
specification (2), we interact Vote with Firm ROA, i.e., the return on total firm assets. In specification (3), we interact Vote with Firm 
equity, i.e., the log of firm equity capital. In specification (4), we interact Vote with Firm debt, i.e., the firm debt ratio. In specification 
(5), we interact Vote with Firm asset growth, i.e., the log of the change in firm total assets. In specification (6), we interact Vote with 
Firm retained earnings, i.e., the log of firm retained earnings. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Vote 72.506 -63.894* 3.333 -120.061*** -86.184** -70.192** 
 [1.157] [-1.827] [0.073] [-3.607] [-2.364] [-2.095] 
Vote × Firm size -15.594**      
 [-2.068]      
Vote × Firm ROA  -286.756***     
 
 [-3.918]     
Vote × Firm equity   -9.844**    
 
  [-2.091]    
Vote × Firm debt    110.253*   
    [1.691]   
Vote × Firm asset growth     -20.104*  
     [-1.751]  
Vote × Firm retained earnings      -95.811*** 
      [-3.229] 
Observations 10,472 10,472 10,472 10,472 10,149 10,451 
Adj. R-squared 0.767 0.766 0.767 0.766 0.767 0.768 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 9. Exploring the mechanisms: Government banks 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined 
in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. In specification (1), Vote 
is interacted with Government participant, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if a government participant bank is 
included in the syndicate, otherwise zero. In specification (2), Vote and Government participant are interacted with 
U.S. lender, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the lender is from the U.S., otherwise zero. In specification (3), Vote 
is interacted with Government lead, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if a government lead bank is included in the 
syndicate, otherwise zero. In specification (4), Vote and Government lead are interacted with U.S. lender, i.e., a binary 
variable equal to one if the lender is from the U.S., otherwise zero. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vote -62.976* -55.669* -64.347** -57.169* 
 [-2.024] [-1.844] [-2.177] [-1.890] 
Vote × Government participant -31.972    
 [-0.883]    
Government participant × U.S. lender  20.210   
  [0.760]   
Vote × Government participant × U.S. lender  -21.132   
  [-0.611]   
Vote × Government lead   -99.002*  
   [-1.747]  
Government lead × U.S. lender    71.098* 
    [1.756] 
Vote × Government lead × U.S. lender    -90.565* 
    [-1.808] 
Observations 10,194 10,194 10,194 10,194 
Adj. R-squared 0.774 0.774 0.774 0.774 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table 10. Exploring the mechanisms: Lending relationships 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all 
variables are defined in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered 
by firm and year. In specification (1), Vote is interacted with Lending relationship, i.e., a binary 
variable equal to 1 for a prior lending relationship between the lender and the borrower during the 
previous 2-year period, otherwise zero. In specification (2), Vote is interacted with Lending 
relationship number, i.e., the ratio of the number of prior loans between the lender and the 
borrower during the previous 2-year period to the total number of loans received by the borrower 
during the same period. In specification (3), Vote is interacted with Lending relationship amount, 
i.e., the ratio of the amount of prior loans between the lender and the borrower during the previous 
2-year period to the total amount of loans received by the borrower during the same period. The 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Vote -80.724** -82.131** -84.993** 
 [-2.387] [-2.391] [-2.508] 
Vote × Lending relationship -50.150*   
 [-1.866]   
Vote × Lending relationship number  -83.305*  
 
 [-2.055]  
Vote × Lending relationship amount   -83.554** 
 
  [-2.101] 
Observations 10,472 10,472 10,439 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.766 0.767 
Full set of controls Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y 
54 
 
Table 11. Exploring the mechanisms: country relationships 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are 
defined in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each 
specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the lower part of the table. In specification (1), 
we interact Vote with Alliance, i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a formal alliance (either mutual defense 
pact or non-aggression treaty) between the borrower’s country and the U.S., otherwise zero. In specification (2), 
we interact Vote with Direct contiguity, i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a shared border (either land or 
sea) between the borrower’s country and the U.S., otherwise zero. In specification (3), we interact Vote with 
Dependency contiguity, i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a shared border (either land or sea) between the 
colonies/dependencies of the borrower’s country and those of the U.S., otherwise zero. In specification (4), we 
interact Vote with Religion, i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a common religious adherence between the 
borrower’s country and the U.S., otherwise zero. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vote -124.869** -78.144** -109.998*** -86.078** 
 [-2.634] [-2.310] [-2.993] [-2.283] 
Vote × Alliance 49.887    
 [1.024]    
Vote × Direct contiguity  1.352   
 
 [0.030]   
Vote × Dependency contiguity   5.323  
 
  [1.255]  
Vote × Religion    5.181 
    [0.206] 
Observations 10,472 10,472 7,969 10,472 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.764 0.775 0.766 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table 12. Cross-listing and institutional quality 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, 
as given in the lower part of the table. In specification (1), we interact Vote with Cross-listed, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if 
the borrowing firm’s common shares are listed on two or more stock exchanges, otherwise zero. In specification (2), we interact Vote 
with Cross-listed, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the borrowing firm’s common shares are listed on two or more stock exchanges, 
otherwise zero. In specification (3), we interact Vote with Disclosure, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s country 
extent of disclosure intensity index is above the 75th percentile of our sample, and zero otherwise. In specification (4), we interact 
Vote with Investor protection, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s country strength of investor protection index is 
above the 75th percentile of our sample, and zero otherwise. In specification (5), we interact Vote with Legal rights, i.e., a binary 
variable equal to one if the borrower’s country strength of legal rights index is above the 75th percentile of our sample, and zero 
otherwise. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vote -93.101*** -89.116** -96.469* -73.240* -85.848* 
 [-2.869] [-2.795] [-2.063] [-1.944] [-1.902] 
Vote × Cross-listed 46.253**     
 [2.166]     
Vote × Cross-listed in U.S.  48.531*    
  [1.684]    
Vote × Disclosure   71.856**   
 
  [3.019]   
Vote × Investor protection    80.567**  
 
   [2.651]  
Vote × Legal rights     37.385* 
     [1.942] 
Observations 10,362 10,362 6,963 5,941 6,773 
Adj. R-squared 0.767 0.767 0.806 0.818 0.801 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y 
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Internet Appendix 
The Diplomacy Discount in Global Syndicated Loans 
 
 
Abstract 
The first section includes information on the definitions of the variables. The second section 
reports (i) results from alternative specifications, (ii) estimates from alternative voting measures, 
(iii) results for AISU, (iv) estimates from Heckman regressions and (iii) results for other loan 
characteristics.
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Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable  Description Source 
   
A. Dependent variables in main specifications 
AISD All-in spread drawn, defined as the sum of the spread over LIBOR plus any facility 
fee. 
DealScan 
AISU  All-in spread undrawn, defined as the sum of the facility fee and the commitment 
fee. 
DealScan 
 
B. Main explanatory variables: Voting measures 
Vote The Signorino and Ritter 2-option index of voting similarity with U.S., averaged 
by UN session for issues deemed important by the U.S. State Department. The 
index ranges from -1 (completely opposite to U.S. vote) to +1 (completely similar 
to U.S. vote).  The index is an average of votes for all issues within a UN session 
(or year). The index is normalized and assumes values between 0 (completely 
opposite to U.S. vote) to +1 (completely similar to U.S. vote). The Vote (non-
normalized) is the initial index non-normalized. The Vote (3-option) is the 
Signorino and Ritter 3-option index, which is the initial index adjusted for missing 
and abstain votes. 
Signorino and 
Ritter (1999) 
Vote with us The Thacker voting similarity index, averaged by UN session for issues deemed 
important by the U.S. State Department, higher is closer political ties.  The index 
is an average of votes for all issues within a UN session (or year). The Thacker 
index has been reversed from Thacker's original measure. The index ranges from 
0 (completely opposite to U.S. vote) and +1 (completely similar to U.S. vote). 
Thacker (2011) 
   
C. Explanatory variables: Loan characteristics 
Loan amount Log of the loan facility amount in USD. DealScan 
Maturity  Loan duration in months. DealScan 
Collateral A binary variable equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral, zero otherwise. DealScan 
Number of lenders The number of banks involved in the syndicated loan. DealScan 
Performance provisions A binary variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions, zero 
otherwise. 
DealScan 
General covenants The total number of covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Financial covenants The number of financial covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Net covenants The number of net covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Loan type A series of binary variables indicating loan type (e.g., term loans, revolvers, etc.). DealScan 
Loan purpose A series of binary variables indicating loan purpose (e.g., corporate purpose, debt 
repay, etc.). 
DealScan 
Government lead A binary variable equal to one if at least one lead lender in the syndicate is a 
government lender, otherwise zero. The lender is classified as government lender, 
if it is owned by the government, directly or indirectly, at least at the 20% level. 
Bankscope 
Government participant A binary variable equal to one if at least one participant lender in the syndicate is 
a government lender, otherwise zero. The lender is classified as government lender, 
if it is owned by the government, directly or indirectly, at least at the 20% level. 
Bankscope 
Lending relationship A binary variable equal to one for a prior loan facility between the lender and the 
borrower in the 2-year period before the loan facility’s origination year, zero 
otherwise. 
DealScan 
 
Lending relationship number The ratio of the number of prior loan facilities between the lender and the borrower 
in the 2-year period before the loan facility’s origination year to the total number 
of loans received by the borrower during the same period. 
DealScan 
 
Lending relationship amount The ratio of the amount of prior loan facilities between the lender and the borrower 
in the 2-year period before the loan facility’s origination year to the total amount 
of loans received by the borrower during the same period. 
DealScan 
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D. Explanatory variables: Lender characteristics  
Bank size The log of total bank assets. Compustat 
Bank ROA The return on total bank assets. Compustat 
Bank NPLs The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Compustat 
 
E. Explanatory variables: Borrower characteristics 
Firm size The log of total firm assets. Compustat 
Firm ROA The return on total firm assets. Compustat 
Firm equity The log of firm common equity capital. Compustat 
Firm debt The ratio of total debt to total assets. Compustat 
Firm asset growth The growth in total firm assets.  Compustat 
Firm retained earnings The ratio of retained earnings to total assets. Compustat 
Firm leverage The ratio of total debt to common equity. Compustat 
Firm tangibility The ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Compustat 
Firm credit rating The credit rating converted to numerical values. The values range from 1 (AAA+) 
to 22 (D/SD). 
S&P Credit 
Ratings 
Cross-listed A binary variable equal to one if the firm’s common shares are listed on one or 
more foreign stock exchanges in addition to the firm’s domestic stock exchange, 
and zero otherwise. The variable Cross-listed in U.S. is the equivalent variable if 
the firm’s common shares are listed on a U.S. stock exchange (in addition to its 
domestic stock exchange). 
Compustat; 
firm disclosures 
   
F. Explanatory variables: Borrower’s country characteristics 
GDP growth The annual GDP growth rate (%). WDI 
GDP per capita The annual GDP per capita in constant prices (in USD thousand). WDI 
US economic aid U.S. economic aid commitments (in constant USD terms) as percentage of the 
recipient’s (borrower’s country) GDP. 
USAID 
Greenbook 
US military aid U.S. military aid commitments (in constant USD terms) as percentage of the 
recipient’s (borrower’s country) GDP. 
USAID 
Greenbook 
Population The country’s population (in millions).  
Polity (borrower) Polity score in the borrower’s country. The polity score is the average of freedom 
house and the combined polity score. The freedom house is the average of the 
political rights index and the civil liberties index. The combined polity score is 
computed by subtracting the autocracy score (an eleven point autocracy scale) from 
the democracy score (an eleven point democracy score). The resulting unified 
polity scale for Polity ranges from 10 (most democratic) to 0 (least democratic). 
Polity IV Project 
(2016) 
The Quality of 
Government 
Institute 
Political rights The political rights index in the borrower’s country. The index ranges from 1 (most 
free) to 7 (least free). 
WDI 
Civil liberties The civil liberties index in the borrower’s country. The index ranges from 1 (most 
free) to 7 (least free). 
WDI 
Debt-to-GDP The annual ratio of public debt to GDP. WDI 
Inflation The annual inflation (%), as measured by the consumer prices index. WDI 
Interbank rate The annual interbank rate (%). WDI 
Disclosure A binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s country extent of disclosure 
intensity index (0-10) is above the 75th percentile of our sample, and zero 
otherwise.  
FactSet 
Investor protection A binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s country strength of investor 
protection index (0-10) is above the 75th percentile of our sample, and zero 
otherwise. The strength of investor protection index is constructed according to the 
DB06-14 methodology. 
FactSet 
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Legal rights A binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s country strength of legal rights 
index (0-10) is above the 75th percentile of our sample, and zero otherwise. The 
strength of legal rights index is constructed according to the DB05-14 
methodology. 
FactSet 
   
G. Explanatory variables: Common characteristics between the Lender’s and Borrower’s countries 
Bilateral trade The annual volume of bilateral trade between the lender’s country and the 
borrower’s country (in USD billion). 
WDI 
 
Alliance A binary variable equal to one for a formal alliance (either mutual defense pact or 
non-aggression treaty) between the borrower’s country and the U.S., otherwise 
zero. 
Correlates of War 
Project 
Direct contiguity A binary variable equal to one for a shared border (either land or sea) between the 
borrower’s country and the U.S., otherwise zero. 
Correlates of War 
Project 
Dependency contiguity A binary variable equal to one for a shared border (either land or sea) between the 
colonies/dependencies of the borrower’s country and those of the U.S., otherwise 
zero. 
Correlates of War 
Project 
Religion A binary variable equal to one for a common religious adherence between the 
borrower’s country and the U.S., otherwise zero. 
Correlates of War 
Project 
Trade balance Annual trade balance between the lender’s and the borrower’s countries (in USD 
million). Trade balance is calculated as (exports of lender’s country/exports of 
borrower’s country)-(imports of lender’s country/imports of borrower’s country). 
OECD 
 
Polity Difference in polity score between the lender’s and the borrower’s countries. The 
polity score is the average of freedom house and the combined polity score. The 
freedom house is the average of the political rights index and the civil liberties 
index. The combined polity score is computed by subtracting the autocracy score 
(an eleven point autocracy scale) from the democracy score (an eleven point 
democracy score). The resulting unified polity scale for Polity ranges from 10 
(most democratic) to 0 (least democratic). 
Polity IV Project 
(2016) 
The Quality of 
Government 
Institute 
 
H.  Explanatory variables: U.S. conditions 
Republican party A binary variable equal to one if the incumbent U.S. President comes from the 
Republican party in the year before the loan facility origination date, otherwise 
zero. 
MIT Election Data 
and Science Lab  
U.S. elections A binary variable equal to one if elections are held in the U.S. in the year before 
the loan facility origination date, otherwise zero. 
MIT Election Data 
and Science Lab 
 
I. Explanatory variables: Global conditions 
Geopolitical risk A monthly indicator of geopolitical risk based on newspaper articles covering 
geopolitical tensions (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2018). The index is constructed with 
an algorithm that computes the share of articles related to geopolitical risk in 
leading international newspapers published in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada. These newspapers cover geopolitical events that are of 
global interest, thus often implying an involvement of the United States. The index 
is normalized to average a value of 100 in the decade of 2000-2009. The variable 
Geopolitical risk (threats) is the indicator decomposed into threats components, 
while the variable Geopolitical risk (acts) is the indicator decomposed into acts 
components. 
Caldara and 
Iacoviello (2018) 
VIX The Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX Index). The VIX 
index measures the implied volatility of options on the S&P 500. 
Bloomberg; 
CBOE 
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Table A2. Different loan controls 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are 
defined in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. The last 
part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. Different specifications include 
different loan controls to show that the estimates on the term Vote are not overly sensitive to the loan controls 
used. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vote -96.834** -85.196** -91.821** -87.355** 
 [-2.395] [-2.064] [-2.328] [-2.138] 
Loan amount 
  -8.561*** -6.754** 
 
  [-2.851] [-2.767] 
Maturity 
  0.278** 0.252* 
 
  [2.105] [1.887] 
Collateral 
 41.322***  38.360*** 
 
 [3.626]  [3.459] 
Number of lenders 
 -0.476*  -0.442* 
 
 [-1.923]  [-1.994] 
Performance provisions 
 -4.476 -3.633  
 
 [-0.807] [-0.597]  
General covenants 
 4.800 7.954*  
 
 [1.197] [1.807]  
Bank size 2.984 0.752 0.684 -0.886 
 [0.455] [0.116] [0.110] [-0.137] 
Bank ROA -0.107 0.797 8.733 10.577 
 [-0.003] [0.022] [0.219] [0.294] 
Bank NPLs -0.269 -0.241 -0.266 -0.286 
 [-0.338] [-0.310] [-0.348] [-0.383] 
Firm size -13.015 -15.738 -7.258 -11.643 
 [-1.231] [-1.639] [-0.721] [-1.190] 
Firm ROA -333.023*** -318.400*** -317.617*** -323.338*** 
 [-5.514] [-5.323] [-5.268] [-5.590] 
Firm equity 3.882 4.968 3.555 4.932 
 [0.459] [0.643] [0.442] [0.624] 
Firm debt 30.187 23.188 29.451 25.720 
 [0.745] [0.647] [0.741] [0.696] 
GDP growth -5.833** -5.492** -5.637** -5.604** 
 [-2.566] [-2.436] [-2.467] [-2.470] 
GDP per capita -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 [-1.568] [-1.410] [-1.596] [-1.381] 
Bilateral trade 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [1.192] [1.024] [1.196] [1.062] 
Constant 454.215*** 475.424*** 592.411*** 587.067*** 
 [3.965] [4.060] [4.658] [4.370] 
Observations 5,474 5,474 5,414 5,414 
Adj. R-squared 0.782 0.788 0.788 0.793 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table A3. Different voting measures 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Different specifications include different voting 
measures. Specification (1) includes the non-normalized version of our voting measure (ranging from -1.00 to 1.00) 
measure. Specification (2) includes the contemporaneous non-normalized version of our voting measure (ranging from -
1.00 to 1.00). Specification (3) includes the 3-option normalized version of our voting measure (ranging from 0.00 to 
1.00). Specification (4) includes the Thacker voting similarity index (ranging from 0.00 to 1.00). The *, **, and *** marks 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vote (non-normalized) -51.278**       
 [-2.462]    
Vote (non-normalized current)  -44.745**   
 
 [-2.645]   
Vote (3-option)   -117.971*  
   [-2.034]  
Vote with us    -118.894* 
    [-2.002] 
Loan amount -8.549*** -8.500*** -7.666** -4.951** 
 [-3.546] [-3.506] [-2.586] [-2.252] 
Maturity 0.330** 0.322** 0.428** 0.281* 
 [2.396] [2.335] [2.677] [2.023] 
Collateral 33.396*** 35.066*** 26.552** 33.876** 
 [3.239] [3.280] [2.646] [2.823] 
Number of lenders -0.533** -0.495** -0.516* -0.568** 
 [-2.463] [-2.314] [-2.001] [-2.303] 
Performance provisions -4.607 -5.475 -4.965 -4.395 
 [-1.172] [-1.386] [-0.938] [-0.836] 
General covenants 6.942** 7.274** 6.119 2.093 
 [2.218] [2.310] [1.441] [0.541] 
Bank size -1.414 -1.449 -2.169 -8.204 
 [-0.214] [-0.210] [-0.334] [-1.113] 
Bank ROA 2.369 2.512 5.632* 4.959 
 [0.714] [0.748] [1.818] [1.413] 
Bank NPLs -0.279 -0.339 0.255 -0.322 
 [-0.495] [-0.580] [0.489] [-0.490] 
Firm size -9.437 -7.812 -15.712* -18.527* 
 [-1.247] [-1.006] [-1.819] [-1.966] 
Firm ROA -237.271*** -233.415*** -310.316*** -346.022*** 
 [-4.450] [-4.398] [-5.234] [-5.280] 
Firm equity -3.179 -4.239 3.834 6.311 
 [-0.527] [-0.653] [0.469] [0.769] 
Firm debt 13.588 15.252 15.606 6.708 
 [0.407] [0.457] [0.394] [0.188] 
GDP growth -4.295** -4.155** -2.874 -3.591 
 [-2.413] [-2.281] [-1.427] [-1.682] 
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005* 
 [-0.668] [-0.870] [-1.583] [-1.730] 
Bilateral trade -0.000* -0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 [-1.950] [-1.898] [-1.061] [-1.493] 
Constant 549.227*** 559.338*** 713.744*** 812.670*** 
 [4.008] [3.958] [4.383] [4.508] 
Observations 10,472 10,493 8,745 8,086 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.765 0.784 0.788 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
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Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
63 
 
Table A4. IV regressions: 1st-stage  regressions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is Vote and all variables are defined in Table A1. The 
estimation method is the IV procedure of equations (3) and (1). Each specification presents estimates from the 1st-stage regressions 
at the borrower’s country-year level with standard errors clustered by borrower’s country and year. Each specification includes a 
different set of fixed effects, as given in the last part of the table. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
(1) 
Vote 
(2) 
Vote 
(3) 
Vote 
(4) 
Vote 
US economic aid -0.327 -0.260 -0.308 -0.306 
 [-0.947] [-0.954] [-0.871] [-1.040] 
US military aid -0.046* -0.016* -0.038 -0.022* 
 [-1.989] [-1.855] [-1.624] [-1.893] 
Population 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.001** 
 [1.384] [2.106] [1.446] [2.219] 
Legal origin -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
 [-0.424] [-0.378] [-0.531] [-0.260] 
Polity -0.007 -0.019 -0.006 -0.017 
 [-0.479] [-1.044] [-0.420] [-1.077] 
Political rights -0.012  0.005  
 [-0.573]  [0.177]  
Civil liberties 0.015  0.022  
 [0.749]  [1.041]  
Alliance  -0.005  -0.009 
  [-0.341]  [-0.606] 
Religion  0.058**  0.064** 
  [2.147]  [2.132] 
GDP growth (borrower)   0.005* 0.003 
   [1.721] [1.712] 
GDP per capita (borrower)   0.000 -0.000 
   [0.800] [-1.176] 
Constant 0.749*** 0.852*** 0.687*** 0.850*** 
 [6.449] [5.802] [6.107] [6.359] 
Observations 315 315 315 315 
Adj. R-squared 0.720 0.740 0.724 0.743 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower's country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table A5. Results for AISU 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISU and all variables are defined in Table A1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, 
as given in the last part of the table. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vote -0.544 -1.031 1.188 1.631 1.792 
 [-0.050] [-0.092] [0.124] [0.173] [0.190] 
AISD 0.233*** 0.232*** 0.237*** 0.238*** 0.235*** 
 [9.343] [9.079] [10.335] [10.360] [9.826] 
Loan amount 0.211 0.138 0.119 0.153 0.127 
 [0.417] [0.283] [0.222] [0.292] [0.258] 
Maturity 0.071*** 0.067** -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 
 [2.897] [2.733] [-0.104] [-0.066] [-0.051] 
Collateral 1.452 1.336 2.038 2.033 1.618 
 [0.384] [0.357] [0.619] [0.621] [0.521] 
Number of lenders 0.014 0.016 0.004 0.003 0.014 
 [0.251] [0.294] [0.082] [0.075] [0.298] 
Performance provisions 0.210 0.314 -0.039 -0.074 0.015 
 [0.174] [0.254] [-0.034] [-0.064] [0.012] 
General covenants -0.720 -0.659 -0.802 -0.839 -0.663 
 [-0.558] [-0.512] [-0.829] [-0.886] [-0.726] 
Bank size 1.815 1.923 0.508 0.939 1.870 
 [1.060] [1.136] [0.367] [0.675] [1.221] 
Bank ROA 1.355 1.345 1.439* 1.518* 1.122 
 [1.584] [1.558] [1.759] [1.851] [1.272] 
Bank NPLs 0.063 0.044 -0.009 0.038 0.074 
 [0.523] [0.382] [-0.080] [0.358] [0.678] 
Firm size 1.851 1.943 3.627* 3.596 3.646* 
 [1.013] [1.027] [1.727] [1.704] [1.805] 
Firm ROA -21.78 -20.729 -18.217 -17.621 -18.305 
 [-1.432] [-1.329] [-1.154] [-1.102] [-1.167] 
Firm equity -3.057** -2.942** -3.330** -3.318** -3.761** 
 [-2.508] [-2.361] [-2.317] [-2.330] [-2.641] 
Firm debt -7.697 -6.384 -3.751 -3.609 -4.48 
 [-1.034] [-0.843] [-0.538] [-0.511] [-0.626] 
GDP growth -0.120 0.100 0.223 0.236 0.208 
 [-0.242] [0.199] [0.474] [0.502] [0.435] 
GDP per capita -0.000** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 [-2.635] [-2.117] [-3.079] [-3.113] [-3.260] 
Bilateral trade 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.863] [0.645] [0.307] [0.435] [-1.235] 
Constant -1.918 15.789 28.41 21.942 13.2 
 [-0.064] [0.490] [1.070] [0.817] [0.518] 
Observations 3,322 3,322 3,312 3,312 3,298 
Adj. R-squared 0.890 0.891 0.903 0.904 0.905 
Loan type N N Y Y Y 
Loan purpose N N Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm industry effects N N N N Y 
Lender's country effects N N N Y Y 
Borrower's country effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-pair effects N N N N Y 
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Table A6. Different clustering of standard errors 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. The 
estimation method is OLS. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification and the last line 
of the table denotes the type of standard error clustering (BC&Y refers to Borrower’s country and Year, BC&F refers to Borrower’s 
country and Firm, B&Y refers to Bank and Year, B&F refers to Bank and Firm,, LC&BC refers to Lender’s country and Borrower’s 
country). The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vote -83.910** -83.910*** -83.910** -83.910*** -83.910*** 
 [-2.603] [-2.836] [-2.779] [-3.033] [-4.569] 
Loan amount -8.549*** -8.549*** -8.549*** -8.549*** -8.549*** 
 [-4.190] [-4.562] [-5.108] [-3.855] [-4.536] 
Maturity 0.330* 0.330** 0.330** 0.330** 0.330* 
 [2.014] [2.175] [2.747] [2.617] [2.175] 
Collateral 33.396** 33.396** 33.396*** 33.396*** 33.396** 
 [2.543] [2.635] [3.600] [2.874] [2.450] 
Number of lenders -0.533* -0.533** -0.533*** -0.533** -0.533** 
 [-1.955] [-2.199] [-2.860] [-2.508] [-2.589] 
Performance provisions -4.607 -4.607 -4.607 -4.607 -4.607 
 [-0.956] [-1.083] [-1.455] [-1.032] [-1.216] 
General covenants 6.942** 6.942** 6.942** 6.942* 6.942** 
 [2.155] [2.595] [2.160] [1.910] [2.505] 
Bank size -1.414 -1.414 -1.414 -1.414 -1.414 
 [-0.267] [-0.318] [-0.197] [-0.217] [-0.339] 
Bank ROA 2.369 2.369 2.369 2.369 2.369 
 [0.449] [0.454] [0.798] [1.101] [0.588] 
Bank NPLs -0.279 -0.279 -0.279 -0.279 -0.279 
 [-0.411] [-0.519] [-0.544] [-0.849] [-0.743] 
Firm size -9.437 -9.437 -9.437 -9.437 -9.437 
 [-0.887] [-0.855] [-1.476] [-1.029] [-1.019] 
Firm ROA -237.271** -237.271** -237.271*** -237.271*** -237.271** 
 [-2.653] [-2.753] [-4.600] [-3.973] [-2.628] 
Firm equity -3.179 -3.179 -3.179 -3.179 -3.179 
 [-0.509] [-0.531] [-0.673] [-0.548] [-0.540] 
Firm debt 13.588 13.588 13.588 13.588 13.588 
 [0.389] [0.493] [0.476] [0.529] [0.473] 
GDP growth -4.295 -4.295 -4.295** -4.295** -4.295* 
 [-1.600] [-1.624] [-2.702] [-2.667] [-1.887] 
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-0.497] [-0.538] [-0.760] [-0.758] [-0.622] 
Bilateral trade -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 
 [-2.110] [-2.923] [-2.280] [-2.232] [-2.005] 
Constant 581.859*** 581.859*** 581.859*** 581.859*** 581.859*** 
 [3.625] [3.605] [3.915] [3.730] [4.982] 
Observations 10,472 10,472 10,472 10,472 10,472 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.766 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustering BC&Y BC&F B&Y B&F LC&BC 
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Table A7. Weighted regressions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different weight. In 
specification (1), we weight by the number of loans between the lender’s country and the borrower’s country to the total number of 
loans in our sample. In specification (2), we weight by the number of loans between the lender and the borrower’s country to the 
total number of loans in our sample. In specification (3), we weight by the number of loans between the borrower and the lender’s 
country to the total number of loans in our sample. In specification (4), we weight by the number of loans between the lender and 
the borrower to the total number of loans in our sample. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vote -83.828** -83.853** -83.406** -83.305** -83.828** 
 [-2.461] [-2.459] [-2.457] [-2.447] [-2.461] 
Loan amount -8.550*** -8.545*** -8.528*** -8.452*** -8.550*** 
 [-3.541] [-3.539] [-3.608] [-3.593] [-3.541] 
Maturity 0.329** 0.330** 0.333** 0.331** 0.329** 
 [2.388] [2.393] [2.432] [2.414] [2.388] 
Collateral 33.442*** 33.406*** 33.128*** 33.002*** 33.442*** 
 [3.248] [3.248] [3.231] [3.232] [3.248] 
Number of lenders -0.532** -0.533** -0.537** -0.532** -0.532** 
 [-2.456] [-2.463] [-2.488] [-2.466] [-2.456] 
Performance provisions -4.549 -4.612 -4.419 -4.653 -4.549 
 [-1.160] [-1.172] [-1.130] [-1.185] [-1.160] 
General covenants 6.955** 6.962** 6.924** 6.965** 6.955** 
 [2.229] [2.239] [2.175] [2.222] [2.229] 
Bank size -1.324 -1.476 -1.687 -1.633 -1.324 
 [-0.201] [-0.220] [-0.258] [-0.248] [-0.201] 
Bank ROA 2.298 2.364 2.292 2.394 2.298 
 [0.694] [0.712] [0.692] [0.725] [0.694] 
Bank NPLs -0.266 -0.273 -0.296 -0.292 -0.266 
 [-0.479] [-0.473] [-0.523] [-0.514] [-0.479] 
Firm size -9.528 -9.433 -9.086 -9.415 -9.528 
 [-1.258] [-1.247] [-1.208] [-1.248] [-1.258] 
Firm ROA -236.424*** -237.154*** -236.171*** -236.418*** -236.424*** 
 [-4.435] [-4.432] [-4.429] [-4.432] [-4.435] 
Firm equity -3.114 -3.172 -3.359 -3.240 -3.114 
 [-0.514] [-0.525] [-0.559] [-0.538] [-0.514] 
Firm debt 14.098 13.563 12.828 13.992 14.098 
 [0.421] [0.406] [0.386] [0.422] [0.421] 
GDP growth -4.293** -4.297** -4.342** -4.319** -4.293** 
 [-2.410] [-2.419] [-2.474] [-2.446] [-2.410] 
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-0.662] [-0.668] [-0.650] [-0.630] [-0.662] 
Bilateral trade -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** 
 [-2.140] [-1.953] [-2.173] [-2.050] [-2.140] 
Constant 575.048*** 582.163*** 577.375*** 576.682*** 575.048*** 
 [4.383] [4.407] [4.484] [4.454] [4.383] 
Observations 10,472 10,472 10,472 10,472 10,472 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.766 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table A8. Heckman sample-selection model 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets] from Heckman’s (1979) sample-selection model. The dependent 
variable is in the second line of each panel and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method in Panel A is 
maximum likelihood and in Panel B is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Panel A reports the estimates 
from the first-stage probit model to estimate the determinants of the firm’s loan-taking decision. The lower part panel A 
denotes the dummy variables used in each specification. Panel B reports the estimates from the second-stage OLS 
regression for the effect of voting similarity on loan spreads. Each of the specification in Panel B includes the inverse 
mills ratio (Lambda) from the corresponding specification in Panel A. The lower part of Panel B denotes the type of fixed 
effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: The loan-taking decision by the firm 
 
 
(1) 
Loan deal 
(2) 
Loan deal 
(3) 
Loan deal 
Firm size -0.011 -0.019** -0.028*** 
 [-1.380] [-2.221] [-2.636] 
Firm ROA 0.384*** 0.397*** 0.132 
 [2.793] [2.880] [0.829] 
Firm equity -0.036*** -0.030*** -0.028*** 
 [-4.791] [-3.817] [-2.921] 
Firm debt 0.368*** 0.340*** 0.167** 
 [6.643] [6.093] [2.496] 
Firm leverage  0.001*** 0.003*** 
  [2.675] [2.857] 
Firm tangibility   -0.001 
   [-0.575] 
Loan amount 0.153*** 0.162*** 0.170*** 
 [22.086] [23.048] [19.863] 
Maturity -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 
 [-1.781] [-1.622] [-1.046] 
Collateral 0.460*** 0.439*** 0.329*** 
 [19.359] [18.334] [11.247] 
Number of lenders 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 [29.642] [30.170] [26.946] 
Performance provisions 0.603*** 0.602*** 0.616*** 
 [20.993] [20.953] [18.634] 
General covenants 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.095*** 
 [7.202] [7.233] [5.500] 
Bank size 0.472*** 0.483*** 0.513*** 
 [27.120] [27.560] [24.873] 
Bank ROA -0.025 -0.020 -0.006 
 [-1.368] [-1.077] [-0.267] 
Bank NPLs -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.036*** 
 [-9.675] [-9.751] [-7.052] 
Bank loans 0.711 0.348 0.640 
 [1.444] [0.703] [1.118] 
Firm loans -27.069*** -37.852*** -26.464*** 
 [-10.828] [-12.892] [-7.604] 
Bank-firm loans  139.585*** 172.373*** 
  [7.447] [6.940] 
Constant 148.865*** 139.398*** 151.411*** 
  [30.070] [27.239] [24.884] 
Observations 26,018 26,018 19,259 
Loan type dummies Y Y Y 
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Loan purpose dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Bank dummies Y Y Y 
Firm dummies Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country dummies Y Y Y 
 
Panel B: The effect of Vote on loan spreads 
 
 
(1) 
AISD 
(2) 
AISD 
(3) 
AISD 
Vote -82.559** -82.466** -103.897** 
 [-2.424] [-2.407] [-2.666] 
Loan amount -4.330 -3.797 -3.551 
 [-1.191] [-1.039] [-0.739] 
Maturity 0.318** 0.320** 0.097 
 [2.286] [2.306] [0.770] 
Collateral 44.687*** 45.530*** 43.099*** 
 [3.482] [4.106] [3.084] 
Number of lenders 0.026 0.088 0.028 
 [0.059] [0.226] [0.050] 
Performance provisions 9.104 10.439 6.499 
 [0.910] [1.163] [0.584] 
General covenants 9.208** 9.523** 12.224*** 
 [2.722] [2.779] [3.799] 
Bank size 11.264 12.758 11.786 
 [1.186] [1.473] [1.004] 
Bank ROA 1.584 1.472 2.802 
 [0.468] [0.434] [0.783] 
Bank NPLs -1.512 -1.611 -0.982 
 [-1.373] [-1.607] [-0.953] 
Firm size -10.080 -9.456 -5.855 
 [-1.342] [-1.266] [-0.632] 
Firm ROA -226.549*** -225.661*** -164.492*** 
 [-4.251] [-4.200] [-2.813] 
Firm equity -4.313 -5.163 -8.544 
 [-0.718] [-0.863] [-1.111] 
Firm debt 22.211 21.598 6.792 
 [0.664] [0.639] [0.180] 
GDP growth -4.373** -4.365** -5.023*** 
 [-2.438] [-2.442] [-2.908] 
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-0.694] [-0.733] [-0.516] 
Bilateral trade -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*** 
 [-2.025] [-1.960] [-2.870] 
Lambda 42.566 46.593* 43.801 
 [1.581] [1.972] [1.571] 
Constant 282.218 249.776 260.749 
 [1.217] [1.183] [1.027] 
Observations 10,472 10,472 7,878 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.767 0.780 
Loan type Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
69 
 
Firm effects Y Y Y 
Lender's country effects Y Y Y 
Borrower's country effects Y Y Y 
70 
 
 
Table A9. Different firm- and macro-controls 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Each specification includes a different set of firm- and 
macro-level controls. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Vote -83.677** -88.381** -154.344*** -108.720** -83.534** -84.987** 
 [-2.452] [-2.444] [-4.337] [-2.532] [-2.407] [-2.519] 
Loan amount -8.597*** -8.968*** -14.869*** -8.492** -8.626*** -8.700*** 
 [-3.580] [-3.676] [-3.574] [-2.769] [-3.527] [-3.623] 
Maturity 0.329** 0.335** 0.214 0.304* 0.365** 0.332** 
 [2.396] [2.122] [1.203] [1.931] [2.507] [2.413] 
Collateral 33.808*** 32.103*** 57.996*** 29.785** 36.724*** 33.540*** 
 [3.280] [3.136] [3.509] [2.174] [3.357] [3.252] 
Number of lenders -0.530** -0.527** -0.555* -0.505 -0.522** -0.508** 
 [-2.463] [-2.514] [-1.761] [-1.696] [-2.384] [-2.360] 
Performance provisions -4.720 -4.789 -3.580 -6.032* -5.097 -4.651 
 [-1.197] [-1.229] [-0.547] [-1.814] [-1.287] [-1.159] 
General covenants 6.900** 5.691* 2.499 9.099*** 5.531 7.152** 
 [2.190] [1.866] [0.349] [2.945] [1.688] [2.291] 
Bank size -1.716 -2.056 -4.704 -9.297 -1.664 -1.748 
 [-0.256] [-0.316] [-0.814] [-1.323] [-0.228] [-0.260] 
Bank ROA 2.276 1.596 6.330* -1.930 2.965 2.494 
 [0.685] [0.466] [1.940] [-0.490] [0.780] [0.779] 
Bank NPLs -0.306 -0.279 -0.912 -2.264*** -0.159 -0.277 
 [-0.535] [-0.512] [-1.543] [-2.871] [-0.211] [-0.487] 
Firm size -4.950 -12.474 11.050 1.288 -6.872 -10.172 
 [-0.544] [-1.481] [0.598] [0.165] [-0.881] [-1.356] 
Firm ROA -237.144*** -236.388*** -47.628 -143.489** -220.377*** -241.209*** 
 [-4.402] [-4.595] [-0.660] [-2.147] [-3.822] [-4.526] 
Firm equity -7.440 -1.677 -12.271 -2.831 -3.224 -2.771 
 [-0.949] [-0.248] [-0.799] [-0.536] [-0.480] [-0.460] 
Firm debt 8.519 15.854 -2.973 1.197 1.021 15.606 
 [0.257] [0.457] [-0.053] [0.035] [0.030] [0.466] 
GDP growth -4.191** -4.210** -9.099*** -7.474*** -5.539*** -4.032** 
 [-2.373] [-2.325] [-4.624] [-3.303] [-2.873] [-2.204] 
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.001 0.006** 0.007** -0.002 -0.002 
 [-0.674] [-0.600] [2.152] [2.826] [-0.833] [-0.710] 
Bilateral trade -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
 [-1.883] [-1.594] [-0.655] [-1.660] [-1.682] [-1.764] 
Firm leverage -0.110      
 [-1.459]      
Firm asset growth  -16.145**     
  [-2.211]     
Firm retained earnings  -0.000*     
  [-2.045]     
Firm tangibility   -8.194    
   [-0.600]    
Firm credit rating   10.024***    
   [3.621]    
Debt-to-GDP    0.637   
    [1.503]   
Inflation    -2.577   
    [-1.132]   
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Trade balance     -0.000  
     [-0.154]  
Polity     50.772***  
     [9.264]  
Interbank rate      -1.443 
      [-0.501] 
VIX      0.436 
      [0.875] 
Constant 581.897*** 613.449*** 259.710 212.353 82.624 595.043*** 
 [4.415] [4.405] [1.165] [0.959] [0.483] [4.238] 
Observations 10,472 10,128 4,043 7,349 10,120 10,439 
Adj. R-squared 0.766 0.767 0.813 0.762 0.767 0.766 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower's country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table A10. Other loan characteristics 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is denoted in the second line of the 
table and all variables are defined in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm 
and year. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** 
marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
(1) 
Loan amount 
(2) 
Maturity 
(3) 
Collateral 
(4) 
General covenants 
Vote 0.230 12.252* -0.026 -0.247 
 [0.713] [1.914] [-0.263] [-1.079] 
AISD -0.001*** 0.023** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 [-3.374] [2.574] [3.320] [2.013] 
Loan amount  1.251** -0.027*** 0.007 
  [2.125] [-3.361] [0.439] 
Maturity 0.002**  0.001 -0.000 
 [2.069]  [1.555] [-0.268] 
Collateral -0.296*** 4.395  0.320** 
 [-3.429] [1.597]  [2.371] 
Number of lenders 0.012** 0.127* -0.003*** -0.000 
 [2.666] [1.920] [-3.332] [-0.240] 
Performance provisions 0.068 -0.040 0.016 0.367*** 
 [0.945] [-0.024] [0.555] [5.233] 
General covenants 0.017 -0.230 0.072***  
 [0.447] [-0.271] [3.086]  
Bank size -0.026 2.189 0.033 0.054 
 [-0.884] [1.599] [1.361] [1.066] 
Bank ROA -0.030 0.068 0.005 0.011 
 [-0.794] [0.100] [0.414] [0.337] 
Bank NPLs 0.006 -0.077 0.000 0.002 
 [1.478] [-0.682] [0.099] [0.526] 
Firm size 0.415*** -3.840** 0.064** 0.018 
 [6.128] [-2.338] [2.306] [0.231] 
Firm ROA 1.082** 20.047 0.079 -0.305 
 [2.498] [1.631] [0.449] [-0.617] 
Firm equity -0.041 0.602 -0.023 -0.003 
 [-0.953] [0.552] [-1.175] [-0.052] 
Firm debt 0.265 4.878 0.173 0.186 
 [0.743] [0.667] [1.355] [0.892] 
GDP growth 0.014 0.791** 0.002 0.002 
 [1.002] [2.337] [0.396] [0.108] 
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [-1.412] [-0.785] [0.523] [0.084] 
Bilateral trade 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.768] [-0.632] [0.476] [-1.426] 
Constant 17.511*** 20.565 -0.322 -0.906 
 [19.368] [0.739] [-0.648] [-0.967] 
Observations 10,472 10,472 10,472 10,472 
Adj. R-squared 0.748 0.677 0.751 0.630 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
 
